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Introduction 
 
The mass production society has evolved with great intensity since the enormous 
progression of the communications network, especially the Internet, providing services and 
goods (tangible and intangible) to hundreds of millions of people. 
 The 21st century conceives a high technology society with a permissibility of massive 
unlawful behavior. The broad range of relationships set through the Internet and other 
communications systems, sometimes agglomerating millions of people, allows a very 
considerable number of transgressions of the law. 
 With such a scenario as a backdrop we are aiming at analyzing the law enforcement 
system and the optimal mechanism to prevent and redress harms in the mass information 
society by optimal deterrence, insurance and redistribution by means of mandatory defendant 
class actions. 
 The article also addresses one of the most problematic issue related to defendant class 
actions: the reluctance of the respondents to assume class representation and the absence of an 
appropriate legal fees mechanism to motivate defendant class lawyers. 
 Our premise is that individuals are rational, meaning that they seek their maximum 
welfare. Hence, the ideal legal system should improve individuals’ well-being by minimizing 
the costs of accident risk. This task is best achieved by compulsory aggregation of claims and 
defenses. The latter with incentives to encourage the use of defendant class actions by the 
plaintiffs’ bar, but also by the defendants, in order to exploit scale of investment and economy 
in common questions of the class defense. 
 We urge that the access to justice has to step forward into a combined strategy of the 
substantive law and the procedural law by a collective litigation. This shall be developed on 
the respondents’ pole perspective and under a theoretical frame to attain optimal individual 
well-being and, consequently, a general social welfare. 
 Concerning with mass production accidents, the doctrine are used to consider the 
victims’ angle, therefore, the plaintiffs’ side in litigation. This happens because, commonly, 
the liability remains on the enterprises that create the risk and are responsible for the accidents 
due to: defective design of products; hazardous safety measures for employees; unhealthy 
environment for the population; and so long. 
 However, our approach is on the defendants in order to resolve, once and for all, 
common questions within the defenses of the multitude of respondents to a lawsuit. Although 
defendant class action has shown to be a very useful procedure for the plaintiffs, it is 
important to demonstrate that it is also a functional device for the defendants. As we have 
mentioned, the aggregation of defendants and defenses makes everyone better off, being the 
defendant class action an essential legal instrument for the optimal law enforcement. 
 The objective of this article is to enhance the law enforcement by mandatory 
aggregation of defendants and improvement of the mechanism to incentivize the class lawyer. 
 In Part I, some examples of conflictual relationships that arise out of the knowledge 
society are selected and then briefly analyzed through different litigation strategies. 
 First, under an individual litigation, i.e., on case-by-case lawsuits; second, by bringing 
lawsuits against parties hold responsible for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
vicarious infringement; and third, in a defendants’ aggregative system. 
 Part II depicts the normative theory of individual rational choice that achieves the 
optimal law enforcement system. It maximizes the individuals’ well-being putting everyone 
behind a veil of ignorance. In this sense, it requires legal procedures mandating aggregation of 
claims and defenses. 
 In Part III we summarize an explanatory view of the defendant class actions, its 
origins and the requisites for its certification and maintenance under the current federal 
statute. 
 Part IV analyzes the optimal aggregation of defendants. With this objective, we 
examine the advantages of exploiting investment and economy scales through aggregation of 
defenses. 
 Also, we challenge the assertion that the value of a day in court is antagonist to 
mandatory class action, with the argument that individuals’ well-being is attained by 
representative suits. 
Moreover, we demonstrate that the defendant class actions are a legal device that, 
while enhances everyone’s welfare, is useful for plaintiffs’ bar as well as for defendants, 
working as a protective device against threats of nuisance value suits. 
 In addition, we procure to furnish the appropriate incentives for aggregation of 
defendants by adequate attorney fees methods. With a propositional approach, we compile the 
actual methods to grant attorney fees in class actions and its application to the defendant class 
counsel. 
 
I. The 21st Century Mass Society 
 
The idea of “mass society” has evolved in time. Firstly, it reflected the beginning of 
the industrialization in the 18th century, when the transformation of the means of production 
from artisanal craftwork to large scale machinery work, forged the concept of mass 
production (of tangible goods). Since, the notion of “mass society” is part of the collective 
conscience. 
 However, in the 21st century, we are living in an information society, where furnishing 
services and goods are made by sophisticated communications links, especially by Internet. In 
addition, many tangible goods are now intangible (for example, a book can be obtained by 
downloading a program by Internet and be read without being touched, with no physical 
contact, just rolling the computer bar); business are faster celebrated with new ways of 
expressing consideration; and, parties are located anywhere in the world. 
 In like degree, it is quite fair to say that one of the most extraordinary advancement in 
the contemporary society has been the creation and diffusion of the Internet. To have an idea 
of the immeasurable growth of the users of the Internet is enough to reveal that in the United 
States, in four years, it has reached the number of 50 millions while to get this number, 
television took 13 years, personal computer 16 years, and the radio 38 years.1
1 Data obtained from the “Sociedade da Informação no Brasil - Livro Verde”, 3 (“Information Society in Brazil - 
Green Book”). This study is the result of the work developed by the Brazilian Science and Technology Ministry 
containing the goals for the implementation of the Information Society Program and is formed by a consolidated 
summary of the applications of the information technologies. 
 
The possibility of people to communicate to each other, from a computer connection, 
to access banking data, or, to accomplish business all over the globe, is a phenomenon of 
integration and development of the civilization. 
 The so-called “information society” resemblances the new face of the “mass society”. 
It generates a new step in the relationship among nations, influencing political and 
economical systems and even the sovereignty of each the people. In Brazil, for example, the 
Information Society Program intends to impose a shared responsibility among private 
initiative sectors (entrepreneurial and civil society) and the public sector, aiming at 
“integrating, coordinating and incentivizing actions for the use of communication and 
information technologies as a mean to contribute to the social inclusion of all Brazilian 
citizens in the new society and, at the same time, to contribute to the country economy to gain 
conditions to compete in the global market”.2
To that extent, the great challenge is to make use of the advanced communication 
knowledge and the Internet to promote the enrichment of the modern culture under a human 
and ethic perspective and not just to employs it as a technological device, without aggregating 
better life conditions to the entire information society. 
 Lawyers, judges, public prosecutors, in summary, the whole legal community much 
more than being alert to the mentioned advent, shall act affirmatively, proposing changes, 
trying to furnish normative elements for the relationships created by this new “mass society”.3
Consequently, the random offer of goods and services to hundreds of thousands of 
people induces lawful and unlawful behaviors. For instance, satellite television network: one 
may assume that most of the consumers act in a proper manner paying for the service; 
nonetheless, others may utilize some sort of gadget in order to receipt the transmission 
without retribution. Similarly, downloading music and films by the Internet: some users will 
pay for obtaining the music and films and others will simple infringe the copyrighted works. 
 
2 “Sociedade da Informação no Brasil - Livro Verde”, 10. 
 
3 I use the locution “legal community” to express a broader meaning than “law operators”, i.e., lawyers, judges 
and public prosecutors. Referring to “legal community” one may include a person or an entity that is direct 
involved with and influenced by any specific domain or area of the law. For example, tenants in general are part 
of the legal community regarding proposed legislation that may interfere with their lease agreements. 
 
In this sense, there is a substantial modification on the law enforcement that has to be 
realized by the law operators and a choice of solutions to be made in order to achieve the 
optimal enforcement level. 
 On one hand, there is the possibility to file lawsuits separately, one by one, against 
individual wrongdoer. Is easy to verify that this path, not even by far, accomplish the 
objectives of compensation and deterrence of the law. 
 This strategy has been largely employed by DirecTV, a company that broadcasts 
television programs through satellite transmissions. The satellite technology used by DirecTV 
requires the installation of a satellite dish, an integrated receiver/decoder and an access card.  
 DirecTV had sent thousands of letters to persons alleging that they would be stealing 
the company’s satellite signal by using modified DirecTV access cards (“smart cards”) and 
offered a settlement agreement.4 The smart cards are said to be a device that may be used in 
legal and meaningful purposes.5
In addition, DirecTV has created an Internet site that “provides information 
concerning civil actions brought by DirecTV against those who fraudulently obtain DirecTV 
programming without authorization by and proper payment to DirecTV or illegally design, 
 
4 The settlement agreement inserted in the “cease and desist” letters consisted of: “(1) surrender illegally 
modified Access Cards or other satellite signal theft devices in your possession, custody or control; (2) execute a 
written statement to the effect that you will not purchase or use illegal signal theft devices to obtain satellite 
programming in the future, nor will you have an involvement in the unauthorized reception and use of the 
DirecTV’s satellite television programming; and (3) pay a monetary sum to DirecTV for your past wrongful 
conduct and the damages thereby incurred by the company”, see, http://www.directvdefense.org/files (last 
visited in March 17th, 2006). 
 
5 “Smart cards are an important, and legal, branch of emerging technology, but satellite TV giant DirecTV has 
launched a legal campaign that threatens smartcard researchers and innovators. Over the past few years, the 
company has sent hundreds of thousands of demand letters and filed nearly 24,000 federal lawsuits in response 
to the mere purchase of smart card readers, emulators, unloopers, reprogrammers, bootloaders, and blockers. The 
satellite TV company accuses techies – some of whom threw out their televisions in favor of the Internet long 
ago – of using these devices to illegally intercept its signals. But the smart card readers and their various 
derivatives are capable of so much more: they secure computer networks, enable user-based identification, and 
further scientific discovery. People who intercept DirectTV’s satellite signal are breaking the law. However, 
DirecTV’s cease and desist letter campaign does not distinguish the legitimate users from the thieves. This 
website is meant as a legal resource for the legitimate computer scientists, technology workers, and hobbyists 
who are being harassed by DirecTV's no holds-barred slash-and-burn legal strategy. This site provides scientists, 
researchers, innovators and their lawyers with the resources necessary to fight DirecTV and protect their right to 
own and use multi-purpose technology for its legal applications – and without fear of reprisal”, see,
http://www.directvdefense.org/ (last visited in March 17th, 2006). 
 
manufacture, market, sell, or use devices that allow access to satellite signals without payment 
to DirecTV”.6
According to the referred site, over 25,000 individuals had been suited for fraud and 
piracy in violating television satellite signal. One can realize that this is a small number 
comparing with the estimate for this year that the number of violators of DirecTV’s signal 
may reach 3.3 million people, according to the Carmel Group, a communications-consulting 
firm, cited by Forbes Magazine journalist, Dorothy Pomerantz.7
On the other hand, the ideal solution is to aggregate all claims and defenses, so uniting 
plaintiffs and defendants in collective litigation. 
 In some instances, litigation direct to the commonly called “gatekeepers” may be the 
ideal solution to resolve the conflict over an unnumbered parties.8 The procedure is to bring a 
lawsuit against persons or entities that furnish the market with the resources that allow the 
wrongful behavior. 
 Considering the previous examples, the suit is to be filed against hardware 
manufactures and or computer technicians that develop and produce tools enabling 
unauthorized satellite television transmission. In the second case, the action is brought against 
the enterprises that provide file sharing services through peer-to-peer network (“p2p”) or 
freely distribute software that permits downloading copyrighted works through the Internet 
without any retribution to the copyrights’ holders.9
6 http://www.hackhu.com, last visited March 17th, 2006. 
 
7 Stealing the Show, available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/05/29/cz_dp_0529directv.html, (last visited in 
March 17, 2006). 
 
8 The strategy of enforcing the law against the “gatekeepers”, as third-party liability, is fully discussed in Reiner 
H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of Third-Party Enforcement Strategy 2 J. L. Econ & Org. 53 (1986); 
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Control, 93 Yale L. J. 857 (1983-1984). See, also, Assaf 
Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 53 (2003-2004). For the view of the plaintiffs’ attorneys as the 
system’s gatekeepers, see, David Rosenberg, The Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Case: a “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 889-92 (1983-1984); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass 
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L. J. 561, 574-5 (1986-1987). 
 
9 See, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F. 3d 
643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 
In one of the most recent case, the Supreme Court held companies secondary liable on 
the theory of contributory and vicarious infringement because they provided software to 
consumers that use them to violate copyrighted works: 
 
“The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful one, 
given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using StreamCast’s and 
Grokster’s software. When a widely shared service or product is used to commit 
infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively 
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the 
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
vicarious infringement. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645-646 
(CA7 2003). One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging 
direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,
443 F2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971), and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein & 
Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (CA2 1963)”.10 
Notwithstanding, our focus is in an alternative for law enforcement in the information 
society: the defendant class action.11 
The option for defendant class action takes into consideration the deterrence function 
of the law and civil as well as its insurance objective. As a result, the ideal of distributive 
justice is better served. The procedural law has to be seeing as a tool to achieve the principles 
enacted in the substantive law.12 
Regardless of the eternal debate concerning the distinction between substantive law 
and procedural law, which is beyond the objective of this work, it is important to realize that 
the science of law has for a long time matured and does not considered any longer the 
 
10 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,  (2005) 
 
11 See, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Enforcing the Social Compact Through Representative Litigation, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 
1239, 1239-40, 1254-6 (2000-2001) (analyzing the mass tort in the 21st century and reinforcing the use of class 
actions). 
 
12 See, Part II, infra.
procedural law an appendix of the substantive law, or even, a domain of law that has an end 
on its own.13 
Procedural law has to be applied in order to carry out the objectives of the substantive 
law. The legal process is the instrument to perform the goals of social’s peace, equality and 
welfare that are within the principles of the substantive law. Hence, using the tools that are 
provided by legal proceedings shall not be considered as violating the Rules Enabling Act14 or 
the Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 
We urge that the access to justice has to step forward into a combined strategy of the 
substantive law and the procedural law by a collective litigation developed on the 
respondents’ pole perspective and under a theoretical economic feature to attain optimal 
individuals’ well-being.16 
13 For further discussion about the distinction between substantive law and procedural law, see, generally, Walter 
Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333 (1932-1933) 
(discussing that the purpose of the characterization is the element for distinguishing a law as substantive or 
procedural); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the 
Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47. S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1973-1974) (discussion within consumer class action 
context; starts from an analysis of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. (312 U.S. 1 - 1941) and Hanna v. Plumer (380 U.S. 
460 - 1965), and proposes a “widespread publicly controversy” test to define the substantive or procedural nature 
of the statute); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 
397 (1975-1976) (criticizing, in the class action context, the decisions in Snyder v. Harris (394 U.S. 332 - 1969) 
and Zahn v. International Paper Co. (414 U.S. 291 - 1973) that did not permit that procedural changes 
influenced jurisdictional decisions, and, suggesting that a procedural rule is consistent with the provisions of the 
Rule 82, of the Fed. R. Civ. P., solely if it has a procedure purpose which implementation is not barred by a 
jurisdictional rule); Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L. 
J. 281 (1989) (discussing an ambivalent nature, substantive-procedural, of the statutes of limitation); Elizabeth 
Barke Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant Class: a Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 1990 
BYU L. Rev. 909 (1990) (criticizing the decision in United States v. Trucking Employers Inc. (72 F.R.D. 98 – 
1976) that allowed certification of class action with expansion of jurisdiction and venue, therefore, violating the 
Rule 82, of the Fed. R. Civ. P). 
 
14 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence: power to prescribe.
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power t prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and 
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) 
and courts of appeals. 
 (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such 
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. 
 (c) Such rules may define when ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 
1291 of this title. 
 
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected. 
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts 
or the venue of actions therein. An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) shall not be 
treated as civil action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1391-1392. 
 
16 This position advances the three “waves” for the access to justice generated from the meticulous world survey 
concerning that matter, chiefly organized by Professor Mauro Cappelletti, by reinforcing that the distributive 
We aim at demonstrating that the defendant class action is the law enforcement 
mechanism that obtains the individual welfare under both ex ante and ex post perspectives.17 
Distinguishing wrongdoers from the law-abiding public, the defendant class action 
operates a deterrence effect impeding the under-deterrence that occurs when the mentioned 
difference is not made. 
 Assuredly, the lack of distinction induces and awards the illegal conduct, as the 
wrongdoers are certain that they are not going to be prosecuted. Their harm is not redressed. 
 The collectivized litigation resolves, once and for all, all common questions involving 
claims, issues and defenses, optimizing investment in precautionary measures to perform the 
best deterrence and enhancing judicial and process resources resulting in the ideal 
compensation.18 
In addition, from the sole perspective of the aggregation of the wrongdoers, the class 
action procedure, confers multiple defendants economy of scale for the litigation, 
consequently, the advantage for exploiting it to maximize their resources in common 
defenses, achieving the desired ex post litigation status.
The early lesson of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes questioning how much it is 
desirable to the public to insure the safety against liability is still updated.19 
The answer that we advocate is of an ideal model of law enforcement system that 
grants everyone the best well-being, before and after the fact of a given situation, due to 
optimal deterrence of unreasonable risks, optimal insurance of reasonable risks, and optimal 
redistribution of wealth by progressively funding the preceding two elements. 
 
justice demands joint theoretical and pragmatical application of substantive and procedural laws. See, Mauro 
Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, Access to Justice. A World Survey, 5-124 (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 
1978.Vol. I, Book 1). 
 
17 See, Part II, B, infra.
18 See, Part II, C, infra.
19 “Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like, 
where the damages might be taken to lie where they fell by legal judgment. But the torts with which our courts 
are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well known business. They are injuries to person or 
property by railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and sooner of later goes into the 
price paid by the public. The public really pays the damages, and the question of liability, if pressed far enough 
is really the question how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose work it uses”; 
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 (1897). 
 
II. The Normative Theory of Individual Rational Choice 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The premise of our analysis is that the defendant class action is an important legal 
instrument to enforce the law, and as a consequence, requires incentives to be optimally 
employed. 
 In accordance, despite of the fact that collectivized litigation had majorly being 
considered under the plaintiffs’ perspective by the statutes, the authorities and the academics, 
it is undeniable that the aggregation of defenses is a powerful device. For that reason it should 
not be disregarded to be contemplated globally with the plaintiffs’ class action in the effort of 
enhancing optimal law enforcement. 
 It is important to note that the aggregation of defendants may serve the interests of the 
plaintiff, because ordinarily it is the plaintiff whom requires the certification of a defendant 
class, but the defendant class action also operates on behalf of the defendants.20 
The justification of our proposition is based on the argument that individuals are 
rational, meaning that they seek their maximum well-being. Hence, the ideal legal system 
should improve individuals’ welfare by improving the law enforcement. As a consequence, 
optimal social welfare is accomplished. This task is best achieved by aggregation of claims 
and defenses, the latter with incentives to encourage the use of defendant class action.21 
20 See, Part IV, infra.
21 Much of the text developed here is based upon on Professor David Rosenberg’s theory of mass tort law 
enforcement, presented throughout several works: David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) 
Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19 (2003); Charles Fried and David Rosenberg, 
Making Tort Law: What Should be Done and Who Should do It (The AEI Press, 2003) (cited hereafter as Fried 
and Rosenberg, Making Tort Law); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for 
Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831 (2002); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation 
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871 (2002); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort 
Class Action: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393 (2000); Bruce L. Hay and 
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1377 (2000); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass 
Exposure Cases, 71 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210 (1996); David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort 
Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 695 (1989); David Rosenberg. Class Actions for Mass 
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L. J. 561 (1986-1987); David Rosenberg. The 
Casual Connection in Mass Exposure Case: a “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849 
Regardless that the theory is methodologically developed in relation to tort law, it is a 
normative theory of rational individual choice concerning law enforcement, and so the word 
“accident” may and is employed in a broader sense of wrongful conduct violating the law.22 
Economists refer to this method of policy assessment dependent on individuals’ well-
being as welfare economics, as explained by Professors Kaplow and Shavell: 
 
“The welfare economic conception of individuals’ well-being is a comprehensive one. It 
recognizes not only individuals’ level of material comfort, but also their degree of 
aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they might value, 
however intangible”.23 
We are employing an operational, functional method of study, based on an economic 
analysis of the defendant class action, so we find important to expunge the myth that 
economics deals with money: it is related to resources, its uses and scarcity.24 25 
(1983-1984); David Rosenberg, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation of Similar Claims: The Superiority of Class 
Action vs. CollaterEstoppel vs. Standard Claims Market, Harvard Law School, Public Law Research Paper no 
44 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354100.
22 Mutatis mutandis, see, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970) (cited hereafter as Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents). See, also, David L. Shapiro, 
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 920 n. 12 (1997-1998) (stating that 
the distinction between tort and contract is hard to draw because the former often arises in context of contractual 
arrangement, justifying the inclusion of the latter, for analysis of class action, in the same category of the torts). 
 
23 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 968 (2000-2001). 
 
24 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6 (Aspen 2003) (cited hereafter as Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law); Some Uses and Abuses in Economics in Law, 46 Chi. L. Rev. 281 (1978-1979). 
 
25 For precursors works about the economic analysis of the law, see Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts of Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499 (1960-1961); The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) (cited hereafter as Calabresi, The Costs of 
Accidents); and, R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). For some major modern 
works, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 3-16 (cited in note 21); William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: an Economic Analysis, 9 L. Legal Stud. 517 (1980); Steven Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 1-5 (Harvard University Press 2004) (cited hereafter as Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, published in 
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper Series No. 396, 
available at http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center; Kaplow and Shavell, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (cited in 
note 20); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Aspen 2003). 
 
In addition, we are aware of some contention on the economic approach of the law, 
however, a defense of its appropriateness is without the scope of this work.26 
We simply argue that questions, for instance, concerning the morality of compensation 
with money damages for the contraction of asbestoses, or, about the justice of taking the 
doctor’s eye to redress the patient’s loss of an eye due to medical negligence, are meta-
juridical, in our view, and so far, they are out of the range of our article. 
 The economic perspective applied herein does not serve any ideology; there is no 
intention to approach the substantive law in a critique manner. The normative description of 
the law is a meta-discussion in relation to the optimal enforcement system under an economic 
perspective. 
 
B. The social welfare and the ex ante and ex post perspectives 
 
Imagine the following scheme where a driver is preparing for a car trip and has to 
choose between two different roads. The first highway has a toll that charges ten dollars per 
automobile. The price of the toll is justified to fund the cost of several safety features such as 
new pavement; four paths; wide paths; hard shoulders; night illumination; assistance phones 
every five miles etc. The second one does not charge a toll fare, but the pavement is old and in 
some places it is ruined, there is only one path to go and another to comeback; the path is 
narrow; there is no assistance phone etc. 
 
26 We referred the interested reader in a critique of the economic analysis of the law to: Athur Allen Leff, 
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974) (argues that Posner’s 
theory belongs to the American Legal Nominalism, which bestows on circular vicious rationale concepts that 
neither consider arbitrary normative propositions of Formalism or empirical propositions of Realism, and can not 
adequately analyzes human activity); Law and, 87 Yale L. J. 989 (1977-1978) (a broader critique to the 
possibility of a scientific analysis of the law); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at any Price: a Response to 
Professor Posner’s Economic Theory, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1977-1978) (criticizing Posner’s theory of privacy for 
being simplistic and, therefore, rather avoiding than confronting the complexity of the legal rules); Ronald 
Dworkin, Why efficiency? A response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1979-1980); 
Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980) (affirming that “the descriptive claims of economic analysis as 
they have so far been presented, are radically incomplete”); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a 
Normative Principle, 9 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1980) (arguing that wealth maximization is an absurd principle and 
an unsound ideal); Gary Minda, Toward a more ‘Just’ Economics of Justice – a Review Essay, 10 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1855 (1989); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: the Role of Consent in the Moral and Political 
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 384 (1985). 
 
Assuming that individuals are rational and, hence, seek to maximize their well-being, 
the driver will prefer to take the best road aiming to avoid any accident. In accordance to this 
rationale, this is a decision that he makes before traveling. Before traveling the driver will 
choose the safety road instead of the unsafety one, even though he has to pay a ten dollar toll 
fare.27 
“Behind a veil of ignorance” – expression created by the juris-philosopher John Rawls 
– our driver would prefer to pay the toll to use the best road. He changes his option after being 
certain to have made a secure trip.28 
In accordance to John Rawls theory, people in the original position are behind a veil of 
ignorance so that any principles agreed to will be just. The only particular facts parties know 
are that their society is subject to circumstances of justice whatever it implies, and, general 
facts that affect their choice of the principles of justice. No considerations of concept of 
justice can be advanced unless it is a rational one, supplementing the lack of knowledge of the 
original position. The evaluation of principles is made in harmony to its general and public 
recognition and universal application because it will be complied by everyone. And a rational 
deliberation, assuming certain conditions and restrictions, reach a certain conclusion as that a 
certain concept of justice would be chosen in the original position. However, the original 
position is not an original pact or agreement; it is one that, under certain conditions and 
restrictions, anyone in anytime can adopt its perspective. And these requirements are the veil 
of ignorance.29 
The evolution of John Rawls’ thoughts merged his comprehensive liberal theory into a 
political conception of justice and fairness. He reinforced the idea of the veil behind ignorance 
where the parties are rational, distinguishing rationality from reasonableness and from special 
 
27 Throughout this article we are going to use masculine pronouns for generic reference and not in a gendered 
sense. 
 
28 A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Working on welfare economics and theory 
of risk-taking, John Harsanyi had reached similar conception, approximating cardinal utility function (marginal 
utility of money) in both systems. Giving individuals an “equal chance of being ‘put in the place of’ any 
particular member of society” maximizes cardinal utility function for both welfare economics and theory of 
choices involving risk, as they both are based on this same principle of equal chance without previous 
knowledge of fate (John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 
Pol. Econ. 434 (1953). 
 
29 Id., 118-123. For a critique of the theory of rational behaviour and the response thereto, see, Rosenberg, 2003 
U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 25 n. 13 (cited in note 21). 
psychologies like envy and spite. Rationality is understood in an economic way thus the 
parties can rank their final ends consistently. In order to establish the concept of justice as 
fairness, Rawls enumerate a list of five primary goods to north the parties as they are behind 
the veil of ignorance, which prevents them from knowing the doctrines and conceptions of 
goods of the persons they represent.30 
The choice an individual makes in order to maximize his well-being is sensibly 
different when he knows, or, does not, the situation yet to come. Arguing that individuals are 
rational, meaning that they seek their maximum well-being, the ideal legal system should 
augment individuals’ welfare by minimizing the sum of accident costs, what is optimally 
obtained with the reinforcement of the legal mechanism for aggregation of claims and 
defenses. Consequently, optimal social welfare is obtained. Somewhat accounting on these 
premises, Professor Rosenberg states: 
 
“My argument proceeds from the premises that the legal system should aim to improve 
individuals’ well-being and that individuals seek to maximize their own welfare. In 
short, in the face of accident risks, the legal system should do what an individual 
seeking maximum welfare would prefer. To explain what such a legal regime would 
look like, I adopt and justify the “ex ante” perspective, which places individuals “behind 
a veil of ignorance”, without information about their particular situations in the “ex 
post” world to come of accident risk and scarce resources”.31 
The rational individual makes different choices whether he is facing an uncertainty or 
a certainty state of the world. Putting in other words, there is a sensible difference on an 
individual choice between two states of the world: before and after a certain situation. 
 
30 Justice as Fairness. A Restatment, 87-8 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). The goods, as things 
that political citizens need, being free and equal persons living a complete life, are: (i) the basic rights an 
liberties: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; (ii) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation 
against a background of diverse opportunities; (iii) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority 
and responsibility; (iv) income and wealth; and, (v) the social bases of self-respect. Id., 58-9. 
 
31 Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 840 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1879 (cited in note 
21); Rosenberg, 71 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210, 252-7 (cited in note 21). 
 
Now consider the same individual after the trip in our example. Contrary to his ex ante 
choice, after performing a secure trip, the driver would prefer to save the toll money and 
travel throughout the unsafety highway. Discovering his fate - “the luck of the draw” - the 
individual change his option and disregards of the optimal system legal system, e.g., the 
driver does not care anymore to fund the cost for the best highway for everyone; ex post, he
cares only about his self-interest of saving the toll money. 
 
“Crucially, ex ante and ex post preferences are mutually exclusive concerning the 
fundamental purpose of the legal system in managing accident risk. Ex ante, before 
knowing the relevant accident and legal fates, individuals would rationally prefer a legal 
system that promotes the collective interest in minimizing the sum of accident costs, 
particularly through optimal precautions, insurance, and redistribution. In contrast, ex 
post, after knowing the ‘luck of the draw’, individuals rationally prefer a legal system 
that promotes their separate interests regardless of the consequences of minimizing total 
accident costs (…)”.32 
Accordingly, the mutually exclusive preference is made between a world of 
“uncertainty”, ex ante, before the fact, and, another made after the fact, ex post, under a 
“certainty” of the state of the world. The individual’s response is absolutely contrary in each 
one of these situations. Before knowing the future, the fate, the accident, he chooses a secure 
highway in order to prevent any accident; after the safety trip, he would have chosen to have 
saved the toll money and to drive in the not so safe highway. 
 The individual, ex ante, prefers a legal system that accomplish the collective goal of 
minimizing the sum of accidents; oppositely, ex post, he chooses one that enhances his private 
interests despite of the goal of ideal reduction of the costs of accidents. 
 Three elements should constitute the ideal legal system to optimally reduce the sum of 
cost of accidents: optimal precautions to avoid unreasonable risks, optimal insurance for the 
residual reasonable risks, and, distributive mechanism to fund the preceding functions. 
 
32 Fried and Rosenberg, Making Tort Law, 14 (cited in note 21). 
 
The reasoning developed demonstrates that the optimal social welfare is achieved with 
an aggregative solution, conferring the best well-being to each and every individual, not 
mattering if a prospective plaintiff or defendant in a future lawsuit. 
 
C. The Elements for the Optimal Legal System to Reduce the Costs of Accidents 
 
Employing a legal system that minimizes the cost of accidents, therefore distributing 
more welfare, increases everyone’s well-being in any state of the world, in both ex ante and 
ex post perspectives.33 
Common sense idea states that it is better to prevent than to redress and demonstrates 
that, in general, the deterrence function of the law precedes its compensation function.34 
The deterrent function or effect of a legal provision is always prescribed in the primary 
norm of the rule, establishing the conduct that is either permitted, or prohibited, or mandated, 
according to the three deontic modals of the law. 
 In some sense the deterrent effect is compared to a behaviour modification feature, 
nevertheless, the primary norm of the rule stipulates the conduct, while the secondary norm of 
the same rule carries the sanction for the violation of the former.35 
33 Fried and Rosenberg, Making Tort Law, 17 (cited in note 21). 
 
34 But it is important to notice the alert of David Rosenberg that, even though deterrence is assumed to be a 
“public good”, the private claims market (the analysis is not considering possible defenses market) fails to 
maximize that good, because plaintiffs’ attorneys gain nothing of its production, as they are interested in their 
investment return from the expected judgment of a claim and not the claims’ deterrent effect, Rosenberg, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 849, 901 (cited in note 21). See, also about public vision of class action: Rosenberg, 62 Ind. L. J. 
561, passim (cited in note 21) (discussing the conflict between the ideal of individual justice and collective 
process of class actions, and especially, arguing in favor of mandatory class action for mass torts); Owen Fiss, 
The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 21 (1996) (discussing the private and public 
function of the class actions and question of the adequate representation in relation to the Supreme Courts 
decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1282 (1975-1976) (comparing the separate litigation system (“case-by-case 
litigation”) and the collective litigation system (“class action”) and the interference with the traditional 
adversarial model of litigation). 
 
35 Besides behaviour modification, access to justice and judicial economy are the three stated goals of Canadian 
class actions according to Craig Jones, Theory of Class Actions: Optimal Aggregation in Mass Tort Litigation, 4 
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2003) (cited hereafter as Jones, Theory of Class Actions). 
 
Hence, the deterrence purpose of the law should provide the force for the performance 
of its provisions by threatening firms with liability for full recovery of costs of the harms 
provoked by them. 
 The optimal deterrence prevents risks that are costly to incur than to avoid, the so-
called unreasonable risks. To achieve social welfare and maximize the individuals’ well-
being, the investment of social resources in preventing risks must go further to the point that 
any additional unit of expense in precautionary measures exceeds the benefit of additional risk 
avoided.36 
In one hand, over to ideal level, investments in order to prevent risks of accidents will 
provoke an over-deterrence effect. The excessive cost for precautions is internalized by the 
firms into over-priced goods and services that unbalance the market. Ordinarily, there is a 
constraint of the demand due to the elevation of the price of the goods and services that do not 
correspond any longer to their expected utility. 
 On the other hand, absence of threatening firms with liability for the complete cost of 
their accidents might create an under-deterrence effect. It means that firms will invest less 
than the optimal pattern to avoid risk, what should probably increase the number of accidents 
making everyone worse off. 
 Under optimal deterrence there is a social gain as well as an individual gain. The 
social welfare is a result of the individuals’ expected utility as one internalizes the total costs 
and benefits of the optimal precaution model that prevents unreasonable risk.37 
The second function of civil liability law is to compensate harm inflicted to victims. 
The best way, in the optimal legal system seeking to confer maximum well-being to rational 
individuals by reduction of sum of the cost of accidents, is via optimal insurance for injures 
that arises out of reasonable risks.38 
36 Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 843-4 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1880 (cited in 
note 23). Craig Jones asserts with clarity: “(…) a situation [optimal tort deterrence] in which very few are 
negligent because it will cost more to compensate the victim than to take appropriate precautions”, Jones, Theory 
of Class Actions, 32 (cited in note 35). 
 
37 Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 844 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1881-2 (cited in 
note 21). 
 
38 Steven Shavell states that: “An insurance premium is said to be actuarially fair if it equals the expected cost of 
coverage to the insurer. For instance, if a policy pays of $1,000 with probability 10 percent, the fair premium is 
The reasonable risk is the one that costs society more to avoid than compensate hence 
it is not worth to invest any extra social resource in precaution as there will be no gain of the 
additional risk avoidance. 
 And what would consist of the optimal insurance for compensating the reasonable 
risk? The answers is full coverage is the optimal insurance for the risk-averse individuals once 
it covers all the residual risk that is not prevented by deterrence, and it reflects the ideal 
coverage where an additional investment in the premium yields negative marginal benefits, 
i.e., does not generate any return from the insurance policy. 
 
“Essentially, full insurance coverage equalizes individual’s marginal utility from wealth 
between the accident and no-accident states and thus increases expected utility. The 
individual effectively employs insurance to transfer wealth from the no-accident state to 
the accident state up to the point at which an additional dollar of wealth yields the same 
marginal utility in either state”.39 
The characteristic of risk-aversion people is that the marginal utility of the money 
diminishes as his wealth increases. The more money one has, the less utility he obtains from 
getting more money. Putting it in another way, it is greater the reduction of utility if one 
looses a certain amount of money compared with the increased utility for gaining the same 
amount of money.40 
The high number of insurance policy acquisition evidences that most of the people are 
risk-averse in most of life risk situations.41 
$100, for the expected cost of coverage is $100. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 258 n. 2 
(cited in note 25). 
 
39 Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 845 (cited in note 21). 
 
40 Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 258 (cited in note 25); Richard Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law, 10-11 (cited in note 24). 
 
41 According to Professor Shavell’s references approximately 86% of the population possess health insurance; 
approximately 85% of husband-wife families with children possess life insurance on at least one family member; 
in 2000, approximately 88% of the adult population was covered by the Social Security system; and, over 50% 
of the workforce possess some kind of private disability coverage, Id., 266-7 n. 11 (cited in note 25). 
 
The preference for optimal deterrence instead of compensation is more than a common 
sense idea, as we have noticed above. The individual ex ante would prefer a legal system that 
employs the scarce resources in attaining optimal deterrence rather than insuring unreasonable 
risk.42 
Furthermore, even a full restitution in integrum for exclusively money damages 
compensation may not bring the victim to the original position before the injury. This happens 
because there are other elements that are not completely recouped with money, such as time 
dispensed with recovery measures, distress due to the violation of the right etc.43 
The actual tort system combining deterrence and compensation functions for damages 
may lead to a misinterpretation in the sense that optimal insurance of unreasonable risk should 
prevail over its optimal deterrence. The solution to this problem, as proposed by Professor 
Rosenberg, is to decouple deterrence and compensation effects of civil tort liability.44 
In class action litigation, this objective is reached by creating an insurance fund 
judgment separating deterrence and compensation in two different stages. 
 The judgment determines the an debeatur by establishing liability and fixing a global 
amount for compensation, and then the court stipulates the quantum debeatur to be paid 
individually according to the severity of harm. 
 In the first one, the deterrence function of the law, the court imposes liability and 
stipulates the aggregate damages.45 
In the second stage, compensation operates optimal insurance function by averaging 
specific-claims variables unrelated to the severity of loss. Hence, the redistribution of wealth 
 
42 Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 23 (cited in note 21); 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 846 (cited in note 21). 
 
43 See, generally, Nelson Rodrigues Netto, Tutela Jurisdicional Específica: Mandamental e Executiva ‘Lato 
Sensu’ (Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2002). 
 
44 Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1883-1900 (cited in note 23); David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance 
Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in Tort Claims, Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper no. 
43 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=350940 (cited hereafter as Rosenberg, 
Deregulating Insurance Subrogation). 
 
45 Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1883-5 (cited in note 21). 
 
due to the claims observes the severity of each loss, averaging other variables not related to 
the severity of the loss, in accordance to the evidence produce in this phase of the action.46 
In a nutshell, another solution with the same theoretic basis of separating the 
deterrence and insurance effects of the law would require modification of the actual statutory 
and contractual governing laws. Deregulating insurance subrogation would allow 
governmental and commercial first-party insurers to acquire the complete ownership and 
control of claims, including non-pecuniary, punitive and otherwise damages. The insured, on 
the other side, would get a premium discount according to an average amount of the 
prospective recovery of damage-claims.47 
Considering the wealth differences between people in the real world and the huge 
social resources that are consumed in an ideal legal system to perform optimal deterrence and 
insurance, which is funded by the beneficiaries through market prices paid for products, 
services, labor and taxes for government, the ex ante rational individual prefers a system that 
mandates funding this provisions for redistribution to the less fortunate.48 
“Because such redistribution may depress incentives for productive enterprise and thus 
the availability of the goods at any level, the individual ex ante rationally prefers that 
system optimize the trade-off between wealth variation to motivate work on one hand 
and wealth invariance to fund progressively the availability of basic goods”.49 
The mutually exclusive preference between the ex ante and the ex post perspectives, as 
we have seem in the previous item, attempts to undermine the optimal progressive funding for 
 
46 Rosenberg, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1885-8 (cited in note 21). For a discussion about averaging method and 
application in collective litigation, see, Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg, The individual Justice of Averaging,
published in John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper 
Series No. 396, available at http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center.
47 Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation (cited in note 44). See, the proposal in the context of medical 
malpractice liability, Keneth S. Reinker and David Rosenberg, Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by 
Putting Insurers in Charge (unpublished, on file with the author). 
 
48 Fried and Rosenberg, Making Tort Law, 22-3 (cited in note 21). 
 
49 Id., 23. 
 
the legal system. The “lucky” individual tends to exit or underfund the arrangement as he 
does not have, ex post, incentives to support it. 
 However, these difficulties can be obviated, as explained by Professors Fried and 
Rosenberg, because the rational individual prefers some level of the called progressive 
funding of optimal deterrence and insurance, consistently with any level of wealth 
redistribution that optimizes the trade-off between redistribution to the less well off and 
productive enterprise.50 
Another feature has to be pointed out. Individual’s preferences are mutually exclusive 
in the ex ante and ex post universes. While before knowing his luck, he prefers a optimal legal 
system to minimize the costs of accidents, after the concretization of fate, his option is to 
maximize his interests disregarding of the consequences of reducing total accident costs.  
 Consequently, the individuals’ would choose, ex ante, a legal system that impedes one 
to opt-out or act in conflict to it, ex post.
Charles Fried and David Rosenberg nominated this mechanism as “mast tying”, 
because it prohibits individuals, ex post, from opting out of the system or acting in conflict 
with its rules, in a manner that makes it inefficient to provide optimal deterrence, 
compensation and redistribution that the individuals have chosen ex ante.51 
Choices of firms to refrain from investing optimally in precautions, because the 
accidents have already occurred, or, choices of individuals to not compensating those that 
 
50 Id., 23. Charles Fried and David Rosenberg depict the individuals’ diminishing marginal utility from money 
equating the square root of a given amount of wealth with the welfare the individual would derive from that 
wealth. Then, they illustrate the choice for the progressive funding with an example of a firm that values 
$100,000 and a neighbor that owns $50,000 wealth. In addiction, in order to provide optimal precautions and 
insurance against pollution produced by the firm costs $15,000, being $10,000 the value for optimal precautions 
and $5,000, the actuarially premium (for the concept of optimum actuarial insurance premium, see, note 35 
supra). Two regimes follow: one, the neighbor assumes all the costs as the system does not progressively funds 
the referred expenses. The total net expected welfare is 251.66 resulting from 50% of chance of owing the firm 
with an welfare of 316,23 (the square root of $100,000) plus 50% of being the neighbor with an welfare of 
108.08 (the square root of $35,000 (the original wealth of $50,000 minus funding of $15,000 for deterrence and 
insurance)). Otherwise, in a progressive funding system for wealth redistribution, the firm assumes one third of 
the costs, obtaining a wealth of 308.22 (square root of $95,000, corresponding the original wealth of $100,000 
minus $5,000 for funding the system of precaution and insurance). Add 50% of 308.22 to 50% of the neighbors’ 
wealth of 200 (corresponding to the square root of $40,000 that is the result of the original wealth of $50,000 
minus the two thirds of the costs of optimal system that is $10,000). The final result makes everyone better off, 
whether the firm or the neighbor, with a wealth of 254.11, Fried and Rosenberg, Making Tort Law, 24 (cited in 
note 21). 
 
51 Id., 24. 
 
suffered accidents, because they were lucky and had escaped; or even, choices of the wealthy 
ones to not fund redistribution by granting benefits to the less wealthy, would destroy the 
optimal legal system of precaution and insurance, founded on the original position of absence 
of knowledge of the world to come, the world behind the veil of ignorance. 
 
“The individual would choose a legal system that minimized the sum of accident costs 
through progressively funded optimal precautions and optimal insurance and precluded 
individuals ex post from opting out that mandate or otherwise acting in conflict with it. 
Individuals wish to “tie themselves to the mast” to ensure that the socially optimal and 
individually beneficial preferences they chose ex ante will be carried out in the ex post 
world”.52 
As we can realize, the rational individual would choose an optimal legal system that 
attains ideal social welfare and hence individuals’ well-being, making everyone better off 
before and after the fact of the accident, with optimal precautions to avoid unreasonable risks, 
optimal insurance to compensate reasonable risks, progressive funding with optimal 
redistribution of wealth, and mandatory aggregation of claims and defenses. 
 
III. Explanatory View of the Defendant Class Action 
 
A. The Antecedents of the Defendant Class Action 
 
1. The English Courts of Chancery 
 
In its roots, the representative suits were formed by a group or class of defendants in a 
lawsuit. The legal action was brought by one plaintiff against some certain respondents acting 
on behalf of the whole group, due to the common interests that united this designated class of 
 
52 Id., 24. See, also, Rosenberg, 37 Harv. J. on Legis 393, 402-12, 414-9 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 69 B. U. 
L. Rev. 695, 698-707 (cited in note 21); Hay and Rosenberg, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1383-9 (cited in note 
21); Rosenberg, 71 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210, 224-252 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 62 Ind. L. J. 561, passim (cited 
in note 21). 
 
persons and because of their large number that would make impracticable to order them all to 
appear before the court. 
 The work of the chapter solicitor of Canterbury, C. R. Bunce, in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, to organize the dean and chapter’s muniments, by separating the documents 
that concern the activities of the ecclesiastical courts of Canterbury, made possible to 
acknowledge, in our days, the probable origin and time of the collective litigation, especially 
the defendant class action.53 
Master Martin Rector of Barkway c. Parishioners of Nuthampstead, the ancient name 
for Martin v. Parishioners of Nuthampstead, is a dispute accepted to be the oldest group 
litigation presently known.54 
The case is dated circa 1.199 and involved some parishioners as respondents, 
representing the whole group of parishioners, in a lawsuit brought by the rector of Barkway, 
concerning his rights to tithes and obventions from the chapel and their correlative duties.55 
As we realize the modern class action has its origins in the equity procedures of the 
English Chancery courts, the bills of peace, where a plaintiff suited several defendants as a 
class.56 57 
53 Select Cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Province of Canterbury c. 1200-1301, 2, Introduction. 
London: Selden Society, 1981 (cited hereafter as Ecclesiastical Courts). 
 
54 See, Stephen Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action, 38 (Yale 1987) (cited 
hereafter as Yeazell, Medieval Group Litigation); The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in 
Collective Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 687, 688 (1997). Professor Yeazell makes an interesting sociological 
review of the parties in Martin v. Parishioners of Nuthampstead, if we may say the “opposing powers”, 
concluding that, in the earlier times, the class action was not yet a device supposedly to play a role to defend the 
weak party in the litigation. He illustrates this modern aspect of the class action with the phrase “class action 
historical mission of taking care of the smaller guy” attributed to Judge and Professor Benjamin Kaplan by 
Martin Frankel, in, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge’s Point of View, 32 Antitrust L. J. 295, 299 (1966) (Yeazell, 
Medieval Group Litigation, 688-9). For comments and critique of the referred work, see Robert G. Bone, 
Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U.L. 
L. Rev. 213 (1990); Robert Klonoff and Edward Bilich, Class Actions and other Multi-Party Litigation. Cases 
and Materials, 18-24 (West Group 2000). 
 
55 Ecclesiastical Courts, 8-10 (cited in note 53). 
 
56 This is assertion is undisputed in time. See, Note, Action under the Codes Against Representative Defendants, 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1922-1923); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity, 200 and 153-197 (University 
of Michigan Law School 1950) (cited hereafter as Chafee, Some Problems of Equity); Comments, Defendant 
Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 283, 286, (1985-1986); and, Manual for 
Complex Litigation, Fourth, §21, 243 (2004). 
 
In the Medieval era, defendant class actions were as frequent as plaintiffs’ ones.58 
Today, it is said that the number of plaintiffs’ group litigation supersedes the number of 
defendant class actions.59 
The general rule was that the bill should contained all proper parties, unless justice 
would be best served otherwise by a representative modus, as presented by an earlier 
commentator: 
 
“All persons interested must, in general, be parties to the suit, unless justice will be best 
administered by entrusting the interest of numerous bodies to the protection of a few, or 
of remote to near claimants”.60 
57 In a bill of peace an equity court could resolve a controversy between an individual (called the adversary) and 
several persons (called the multitude), where there was common questions of law or fact, or both, involving each 
and every one of them, and where there was no basis for a party joinder under the common law. 
 
58 Professor Chafee states: “The older cases draw no distinction between a class of defendants and a class of 
plaintiffs”, Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 203 (cited in note 56). 
 
59 Development in the law – Class Action, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1325 and n. 30 (1975-1976) (asserting that by 
far the largest group of class actions on federal court dockets are civil rights cases filed by plaintiffs, with 
approximately 50% of the total of the cases according to statistics for the years 1973-1976) and, Comments, 
Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 283, 283 n. 2, 284 (1985-1986) 
(arguing that civil rights actions constitute the largest percentage of class action suits filed in federal courts, with 
percentages of 38.6% in 1983 and 37.3% in 1984, however, arguing in favor of defendant class action for a 
greater vindication of constitutional and statutory civil rights). The percentage seems to remain the same as 
shown in the Table 2.2 infra, available at http:www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.02.pdf (last visited 
April, 11th, 2006). 
 
60 Basil Montagu, A Digest of Pleading in Equity, 47, vol. I (J. & T. Clarke 1824) (cited hereafter as Montagu, 
Pleading in Equity, v. I). 
Three distinct circumstances authorized the representative litigation: a) when from the 
number of persons some may act on behalf of the whole61; b) where claimants are remote62;
and, c) where necessary parties cannot be brought before the court.63 
According to Basil Montagu the first group embraced, just like the case of Martin v. 
Parishioners of Nuthampstead, suits concerning commoners and rights to tithes: 
 
“A suit may be instituted by a lord of the manor against some of the tenants, or by some 
of the tenants against the lord on a question of common”.64 
Also belonged to the same category suits involving terre-tenants65; committees of 
large bodies66; ship’s companies67; creditors, legatees and trustees68; and, large bodies in 
nature of partnerships. 
 In Adair v. New River Company, a case involving a large body in nature of partnership 
placing as respondents the New River Company and more than one hundred other persons, it 
has been established: 
 
61 Id., 57-63. 
 
62 Id., 63-5. 
 
63 Id., 65-6. 
 
64 Montagu, Pleading in Equity, v. I, 57-8, citing York v. Pilkington, 1737, 1 Atk. 283 (cited in note 60) 
(authority citation, in, Basil Montagu, A Digest of Pleading in Equity, vol. II, 164 note EN, (J. & T. Clarke 1824) 
(cited hereafter as Montagu, Pleading in Equity, v. II). 
 
65 See, Attorney-General v Heelis, 2 Simons and Stuart 67, 57 E.R. 270 (1824). 
 
66 “A suit may be maintained against the committee who contract on behalf of a society” Montagu, Pleading in 
Equity, v. I, 60, citing Cousins v Smith, 13 Ves. 544 (1807) (cited in note 60) (authority citation, in, Montagu, 
Pleading in Equity, v. II, 170 note EX, cited in note 64). 
 
67 In Good v Blewitt, the Master of the Rolls, Sir W. Grant, ruled that: “Bill by one of the Officers and crew of a 
Privateer against the owners for an account of captures, according to the articles. Leave given to amend by 
stating, that the Bill was on behalf of the Plaintiff and all others; and upon that amendment the account was 
decreed” (13 Vesey Junior 397, 33 E.R. 343, 1807). 
 
68 See, Leigh v Thomas 2 Vesey Senior 312, 28 E.R. 201 (1751). 
 
“The general rule, requiring all persons interested to be parties, dispensed with, where it 
is impracticable, or, extremely difficult. In such a case, to obtain a decree, to establish 
the right of suit to a mill, for instance, the Court only requires parties sufficient to 
secure a fair contest; and, the right being established in that way, consequential relief 
may he had against the rest in another suit”.69 
Similarly, in Cockburn v. Thompson, a case concerning a bilateral aggregative 
procedure, the bill was filed by several persons, on behalf of themselves and all others the 
proprietors of a philanthropic institution, against Thompson and other bankers, the Lord 
Chancellor [Eldon] ruled: 
 
“The strict rule, that all persons, materially interested, must be parties, dispensed with, 
where it is impracticable, or very inconvenient: as in the case of a very numerous 
association in a joint concern; in effect a partnership. Defect of parties the subject of 
Demurrer, or Plea; as it appears, or not, on the face of the Bill”70 
The second set of cases, where claimants are remote, are related to contingent estates 
and entails71, and lessees and mortgagees.72 
The third and last group of the classification concerns to cases where necessary parties 
cannot be brought before the court, especially when one is out of the jurisdiction of the 
court.73 
69 11 Vesey Junior 429, 32 E.R. 1153 (1805). 
 
70 16 Vesey Junior 321, 33 E.R. 1005 (1809). 
 
71 “When real property is subject to an entail, or contingent limitation or executory devise, it is generally 
sufficient to make the first person in esse, in whom an estate of inheritance is vested, a party, with those claiming 
prior interests”, Montagu, Pleading in Equity, v. I, 63-4 (cited in note 60). 
 
72 “Persons who claim under the possession of a party whose title to real property is disputed, are not necessary 
parties, unless their rights are to be prejudiced by the suit”, Montagu, Pleading in Equity, 64, v. I. (cited in note 
60). 
 
73 See, Att. Gen. v. Baliol College, in Chancery, Dec. 11th , 1744, apud, Montagu, Pleading in Equity, v. I, 65 n. 
(e) (cited in note 60). 
 
Others commentators emphasize some different topics to classify the old English 
collective procedures, nonetheless, without much of difference in substance. 
 For instance, James Wm. Moore affirms: “At an early date the class action was 
recognized as proper in three situations: (1) where the number of interested persons was so 
great that joinder was impracticable; (2) if joinder were effected, continued abatement by 
death or otherwise would prevent a decree; and (3) where effective joinder of certain 
interested persons was impossible because they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
court”.74 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. points out: a) representation by rule of law; b) where there is a 
large and indefinite number of persons; and, c) when the claim is by or against definite 
persons who are very numerous, being this case, according to the author, the one closest to the 
modern class suit.75 
And, Joseph Story proposes: “The most usual cases arranging themselves under this 
head of exceptions are, (1) where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one 
or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole; (2) where the parties form a voluntary 
association for public or private purposes, and those , who sue, or defend, may fairly be 
presumed to represent the rights and interests of the whole; (3) where the parties are very 
numerous, and although they have, or may have separate distinct interests; yet it is 
impracticable to bring them all before the Court”.76 
2. The American Law and Jurisprudence 
 
a) The Federal Equity Rule 48 (1842) 
 
74 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23 App. 100-20 (Matthew Bender, 3rd Ed.) (cite hereafter as 5 Moore’s Federal 
Practice). 
 
75 Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 209-13 (cited on note 56). 
 
76 Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, §97, 109 (Gaunt Inc, 2001). 
 
Following the English bills of peace, permitting a representative suit in exception to 
the rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties to an action, the United States adopted 
the same sort of legal provision. 
 At this time it was ordinary to have representatives groups of litigants, either in the 
defendants side or in the plaintiffs pole of the procedural relationship, hence, one single rule, 
the Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1842, prescribe for plaintiffs’ and defendants’ class actions.77 
The Equity Rule 48 depicted the collective litigation in one paragraph with two 
sentences. The first one provided, in a very simple and straightforward manner, that whenever 
the parties on either side (therefore, expressly adopting representative lawsuits either of 
plaintiffs or defendants), were so numerous that all could not be brought before the court 
without manifest inconvenience or oppressive delay in the suit, the court discretionarily could 
order the suit to proceed with sufficient parties representing all the adverse interests of the 
plaintiffs and the defendants. 
 However, the second sentence was incoherent with an aggregative procedure, because 
it read: “[B]ut, in such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice to rights and claims of all 
the absent parties”. It does not make sense authorizing a representative party to pursue claims 
or presents defenses, on behalf of a whole class of persons, with similar interests, and at the 
same time release them from the binding effect of the judgment. 
 The incongruous result would be that solely the representative parties of the plaintiffs 
or of the defendants, or even, of both of them, would be bound by the ruling. Meanwhile the 
other members of the classes would be able to go, indefinitely, arguing and defending the 
common adverse interests. In each new lawsuit, the enforcement of the decision would only 
be made upon the representative parties, and, once again, permitting a new class action to be 
filed with different classes representatives. 
 Nevertheless, the literal interpretation of the provision had not been adopted by the 
Supreme Court. In one of the first class action on the American jurisprudence, the case Smith 
v. Swormstedt, Mr. Justice Nelson, delivering the opinion of the Court, ruled: 
 
77 Equity Rule 48 (1842): “Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest 
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense 
with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all 
the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in such cases, the 
decree shall be without prejudice to rights and claims of all the absent parties”.  
 
“An object was taken, on the argument, to the bill for want of proper parties to maintain 
the suit. We think the objection not well founded. (…) For convenience, therefore, and 
to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest 
to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were 
before court” (emphasis added).78 
Therefore, the class action principle of some representing a crowd of persons, with the 
same common interests, and the judgment binding the whole, had been preserved by the 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Equity Rule 48. 
 
b) The Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912) 
 
The rule of representative actions with classes of defendants or plaintiffs was duly 
incorporated into the statutes and, consequently, provided in the new equity Rule 38. 
 The successor of the equity rule of 1842, the equity Rule 38 of 1912, revoked the 
clause concerning the nonbinding effect of the decision, and established two requirements for 
the collective procedure: a common or general question and the impracticability to bring 
before court all members of the class due its large number, as it reads: 
 
Rule 38. When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons 
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the 
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole. 
 
Moreover, the federal equity rule had been integrated into the procedural code of many 
states. Some of them used the same language requiring both requisites to the class action.79 
78 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853). 
 
79 For example, adopted this model the states of Colorado, Florida, Delaware, Connecticut, cf. Carl C. Wheaton, 
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Cornell L. Q. 399, 400 (1933-1934). See also, Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, 3ed., §1751, 14-15, 
(Thomson-West 2005), vol. 7A (cited hereafter as Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice); and discussing the 
requisites for representative suits and its binding effects, William W. Blume, The “Common Questions” 
Others used the disjunctive or admitting the class suit in equity, either if the class was 
numerous or if there was a common interest.80 Anyhow, even in the latter cases, some courts 
interpreted the rules as requiring the fulfillment of both requisites in order to allow the 
collective suit to proceed.81 
Under the provision in comment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine 
established in Smith v. Swormstedt, creating the leading case for the 20th century, concerning 
the binding effect upon the absent parties in a class suit. Mr. Justice Day was emphatic, when 
delivering the opinion of the Court in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, affirming that: 
 
“If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are 
obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all of the class properly 
represented. The parties and the subject-matter are within the court's jurisdiction. It is 
impossible to name all of the class as parties, where, as here, its membership is too 
numerous to bring into court. The subject-matter included the control and disposition of 
the funds of a beneficial organization and was properly cognizable in a court of equity. 
The parties bringing the suit truly represented the interested class. If the decree is to be 
effective and conflicting judgments are to be avoided all of the class must be concluded 
by the decree”.82 
In previous cases, the Supreme Court had had already given binding effect to all 
members of a life insurance policy or of a fraternal benefit scheme represented in a collective 
 
Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 878 (1931-1932); Chester B. 
McLaughlin, The Mysteries of the Representative Suit, 26 Geo. L. J. 878 (1937-1938). 
 
80 For example: California, New York, Ohio, Washington, cf. Wheaton, 19 Cornell L. Q. 399 (cited in note 79). 
 
81 See, Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, 15 (cited in note 79). 
 
82 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921). 
 
suit83, which are considered the precedents for the “limited fund” class actions, as cited in In 
re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 129 B.R. 710 (1991).84 
Anyhow, consideration concerning adequate representation to produce res iudicata to 
all members of a class is still the most intricate aspects of collectivized litigation, and it seems 
not yet totally settled by the Supreme Court.85 
c) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) – Rule 23 
 
In September 16th, 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective86,
producing a major alteration of the law, ceasing the equitable basis for the class actions, as the 
federal statute merged the procedures in Law and Equity, establishing just one form of civil of 
action, in the Rule 2.87 
The Advisory Committee Notes of 1937 to the original Rule 23 stated that the new 
rule was: “a substantial restatement of Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule 
has been construed. It applies to all actions, whether formerly denominated legal or 
equitable”.88 
83 Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green 237 U.S. 531 (1915); Hartford Life Insurance Company v. 
Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Hartford Life Insurance Company v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917). 
84 “In 1912, Rule 48 of the Federal Equity Rules was rewritten as Rule 38. The new rule allowed representative 
suits where the parties were too numerous for joinder. In contrast with the prior rule, absent parties could be 
bound by subsequent judgments pursuant to this provision. One of the best examples of a limited fund case from 
this time period is Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 632, 59 L. Ed. 1165, 35 S. Ct. 692 (1915).The case 
involved an insurer's contingency fund created through contributions from policyholders. The Supreme Court 
found that the policy was properly treated as a unit and that the adjudication of rights to it had to be determined 
in a single suit in which all policyholders were joined. (…) See also Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the 
World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 78-79, 83 L.. Ed. 45, 59 S. Ct. 35 (1938) (group challenge to reorganization of 
fraternal benefit association necessitated compulsory joinder)”, In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos 
Litigation129 B.R. 710, 804 (1991). See, also, Alba Conte and Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Action,
§1:9, 31-2 (Thomson-West 2002) Vol. 1 (cited hereafter as Conte-Newberg, Newberg on Class Action). 
 
85 See, Chafee, Some problems of equity, 230 (cited in note 56); Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1751, 
17 (cited in note 79). 
 
86 Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 (Thomson-West 2005). 
 
87 Rule 2. One Form of Action. There shall be one form of action to be known as “civil action”. 
 
88 Of course it was already part of the History of Law the rigid proceedings of the old common law writs, similar 
to the five legis actiones of the ancient Roman Law, where a de facto situation should strictly reproduce a writ, 
otherwise the action could not be prosecuted. 
 
In accordance to the legal tradition, the Rule 23 established that if the persons 
constituting a class, of defendants or plaintiffs, or both, were so numerous to make it 
impracticable to bring them all before court, one or more could represent the whole class. 
Regarding the representation, the rule accentuated that conducting parties should fairly insure 
the adequate representation of the absent parties.89 
In addition, Rule 23 stipulated a classification of the collective suits, considering the 
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class. Hence, three different 
types of class actions existed in the clauses (1), (2) and (3) of the Rule 23(a), and became to 
be known, respectively, as “true”; “hybrid”; and, “spurious”- where the rights were several, 
and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief 
is sought. 
 The denomination of “true”, “hybrid” and “spurious” types of class actions is 
attributed to Professor James Moore, and even though it is lengthy, we kindly ask to be 
excused to reproduce his lesson explaining each and every one of them: 
 
“Under original Rule 23(a) there were three types of class actions, all of which involved 
a class of persons which was so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring all its 
members before the court, so that a suit on behalf of or against the class could be 
brought by or against one or more members of the class who would insure adequate 
representation of the whole class. The distinction between the types of class suits under 
original Rule 23(a) depended upon the jural relationship among the class members with 
regard to the right sued upon. Thus subdivision (a)(1) of original Rule 23 dealt with the 
true class suit which involved a class in which the right sought to be enforced by or 
against the class was ''joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a 
 
89 Rule 23. Class Actions. 
“(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring 
them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, 
on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is  
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and 
a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property 
involved in the action; or 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is 
sought”. 
 
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes 
entitled to enforce it.'' This class suit involved principles of compulsory joinder, since 
had it not been for the numerosity of the class members all should have been before the 
court. A judgment in a true class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, was 
binding under res judicata principles upon all the members of the class, whether or not 
they were before the court. It was the nondivisible nature of the right sued on which 
determined both the membership of the class and the res judicata effect of the final 
determination of the right. 
Subdivision (a)(2) of original Rule 23 dealt with the hybrid class suit, which involved 
situations in which the rights sought to be enforced by or against the class were several, 
and the object of the action was the adjudication of claims affecting specific property. A 
judgment under (a)(2) was binding under res judicata principles upon all the members 
of the class, but only with regard to claims involving the specific property which it was 
the object of the action to settle. 
Subdivision (a)(3) of original Rule 23 dealt with the spurious class action, where the 
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class was several, and 
there was a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common 
relief was sought. The spurious class action was a permissive joinder device. Once a 
spurious class action was brought, with a class of sufficient numerosity, by 
representatives of the class who could adequately represent the interests of the class, 
other members of the class were free to come forward and join the action. If they did 
not do so, they were not bound, under principles of res judicata, by the outcome of the 
action, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class. The spurious class action thus 
provided a means for the adjudication in one lawsuit of a number of separate claims 
involving common questions of law or fact where a common relief was sought” 
(emphasis added).90 
90 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23 App. 101 (cited in note 76). For further explanation of Professor Moore’s 
doctrine, see, James Wm Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary 
Draft 25 Geo L. J. 551, 571-576 (1936-1937); Marcus Cohn and James Moore, Federal Class Actions, 32 Ill. L. 
Rev. 307, 314-320 (1937-1938); Marcus Cohn and James Moore, Federal Class Actions - Jurisdiction and Effect 
of Judgment, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 550 (1937-1938). See, also, Hiram L. Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 
Minn. L. Rev. 34, 40-56 (1937-1938). 
 
At the outset, the rule had been well regarded as an endeavor to improve the use of 
class actions91, but the practice evidenced otherwise, with courts facing unsurmountable 
difficulties to distinguish the categories of rights to be enforced with the adjectives employed 
of “joint”, “several” and “common”. Besides, it was very difficult to conform the cases into 
the format of the types of the classes prescribed in Rule 23.92 
Early commentators of the federal statute affirmed that: “Rule 23 then is not a rule at 
all; at most it is a restatement of law somewhat comparable to the volumes of American Law 
Institute, or better, a caveat therein”.93 
91 “Rule 23 as to class actions is simple and intelligible, which is more than can be said of any rule that I know of 
heretofore promulgated either by statute or court rule”, Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. Va. 
L. Q. 5, 16 (1938-1939). See, also, William VanDercreek, The “Is” and “Ought” of Class Action under Federal 
Rule 23, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1962-1963). 
 
92 Extensive critique had been made by the Advisory Committee Note of 1966 to Revision of Rule 23: 
“Difficulties with the original rule. The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in terms of 
the abstract nature of the rights involved: the so-called “true” category was defined as involving “joint, common, 
or secondary right”; the “hybrid” category, as involving “'several”' rights related to “'specific property”; the 
“spurious” category, as involving “several” rights affected by a common question and related to common relief. 
It was thought that the definitions accurately described the situations amenable to the class-suit device, and also 
would indicate the proper extent of the judgment in each category, which would in turn help to determine the res 
judicata effect of the judgment if questioned in a later action. Thus the judgments in “true” and “hybrid” class 
actions would extend to the class (although in somewhat different ways); the judgment in a “spurious” class 
action would extend only to the parties including intervenors. (…) In practice the terms “joint”, “common” etc., 
which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification proved obscure and uncertain. (…) The courts have 
considerable difficulty with these terms. (…) Nor did the rule provide an adequate guide to the proper extent of 
the judgments in class actions. First, we find instances of the courts classifying actions as “true” or intimating 
that the judgments would be decisive for the class where these results seemed appropriate but were reached by 
dint of depriving the word “several” of coherent meaning. (…) Second, we find cases classified by the courts as 
“spurious” in which, on a realistic view, it would seem fitting for the judgments to extend to the class. (…) The 
“spurious” action envisaged by original Rule 23 was in any event an anomaly because, although denominated a 
“class” action and pleaded as such, it was supposed not to adjudicate the rights or liabilities of any person not a 
party. It was believed to be an advantage of the “spurious” category that it would invite decisions that a member 
of the “class” could, like a member of the class in a “true” or “hybrid” action, intervene on an ancillary basis 
without being required to show an independent basis of Federal jurisdiction, and have the benefit of the date of 
the commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations. (…) These results were attained in 
some instances but not in others. (…) The results, however, can hardly depend upon the mere appearance of a 
''spurious'' category in the rule; they should turn on more basic considerations. (…) Finally, the original rule did 
not squarely address itself to the question of the measures that might be taken during the course of the action to 
assure procedural fairness, particularly giving notice to members of the class, which may in turn be related in 
some instances to the extension of the judgment to the class”. 
 
93 Harry Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
684, 706 (1940-1941). Professor Chafee asserted that: “This tribute to the memory of Wesley Hohfeld would be 
more suitable in a law review than in an enactment which is to guide the actions of practical men day in and day 
out”, Some problems of equity, 246 (cited in note 54). See, also, Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1752 
(cited in note 79); Conte-Newberg, Newberg on Class Action, §1:10, 33, (cited in note 84); Benjamin Kaplan, 
A point to be noted is that the “spurious” class action, as above explained by Professor 
Moore, adopted an opting-in system, i.e., in order to be bound by the decision, whether 
favorable or unfavorable to the class, the members ought to come forward and join the 
action.94 
The Rule 23 in effect today stipulates two mandatory class action under subdivision 
(b)(1) and subdivision (b)(2), and, one opting-out provision under subdivision (b)(3) as 
established by the subdivision (c)(2).95 96 
B. The Characteristic of the Defendant Class Action 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The use of defendant class action is ample and there is no legal restriction for its 
application in any field of law. However, it is more frequent in lawsuits involving civil 
 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 
Harv. L. Rev. 356, 380-6 (1967-1968); Richard L. Marcus & Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation, 210 
(West Group 1998); Notes, Federal Class Actions: a Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 802, 
818-836 (1946); Irving A. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois 42 
Ill L Rev 518, 518-533 (1947-1948); Arthur J. Keeffe, Stanley M. Levy and Richard P. Donovan, Lee Defeats 
Ben Hur 33 Corn LQ 327(1947-1948); Note, Binding Effects of Class Actions, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1059-
1067 (1953-1954); Developments in the Law – Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 
874, 928-943 (1957); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L. 
Rev. 433 (1959-1960); Joseph J. Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class Suits 60 Mich L Rev 905 (1961-1962). 
 
94 See, also, Chafee, Some problems of equity, 259 et seq (cited in note 54); Kaplan, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 396-8 
(cited in note 93). But, compare, Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1752, 30-42, (cited in note 79); Kalven 
and Rosenfield, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 711 (advocating a secundum eventum litis effect of the judgment in order 
to allow the absent plaintiffs to join the suit if the decision was favorable and not to be bound by its decree if it is 
unfavorable) (cited in note 93). 
 
95 Rule 23(c)(2). “In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members 
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who 
can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude 
the member from the case if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or 
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion 
may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel”. 
 
96 See, Martin H. Redish, Class Action and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private 
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 71, 130-2 (2003) (arguing for a replacement of the opt-out 
rule with an opting-in mechanism). 
 
rights97; disputes challenging constitutionality of state and local law and practices enforced by 
public officials; suits against unincorporated associations, e.g., labor unions. But defendants’ 
classes have also been certified in other contexts, such as patent infringement; antitrust; 
securities, and environmental.98 
The multiple goals or principles of collective suits are applicable both to plaintiffs’ 
and defendants’ class actions: (i) access to justice; (ii) deterrence or policing behaviors; (iii) 
equilibrium of the parties in litigation; (iv) judicial and process resources economy; and, (v) 
avoidance of incompatible adjudication. 
 Without analyzing the defendants’ point of view, one commentator has enumerated 
five advantages plaintiffs can gain with defendant class action: prosecution of low stakes 
claims (goals of access to justice and parties equilibrium); tolling of the limitations period 
against the whole class (goal of resources economy); prevention of collateral estoppel (goal of 
resources economy); avoidance of incompatible decisions (goal of avoidance of incompatible 
adjudication); and overcoming problems of personal jurisdiction and venue (goal of access to 
justice).99 
It is noteworthy that the advantages of the defendant class action are not limited to the 
plaintiffs. The defendant class action is a collective device that is operational, functional, 
favoring, indistinctively, authors or respondents in representative suits. 
 As a consequence, the augment of the law enforcement, by means of collective 
litigation, might diminished or ceased, where there is the possibility of class members (either 
 
97 See, Part III, A.1, note 59, supra.
98 See, commentators and case authorities cited therein: Conte-Newberg, Newberg on class action, §4:51, 352 n. 
1, 353 nn. 2-5, 354 nn. 6-9, 355 nn. 10-1 (cited in note 84); Notes, Defendant Class Actions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 
630, 632 nn. 11-5 (1977-1978); Barry M. Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 459 n. 4 
(1977); Note, Development in the law – Class Action, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1325 and n. 30 (cited in note 57); 
Comments, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 283, 283 n. 2, 284 
(cited in note 57); Debra J. Gross, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of 
Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 Emory L. J. 611, 616 n. 18 (1991); A. Peter Parsons and Kenneth 
W. Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 Ecology 
L. Q. 881, 882 n. 6 (1974-1975); Note, Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 23 Defendant Class Action 53 Ind. L. J. 
841, 844 (1977-1978); Spencer Williams, Some Defendants have Class: Reflections on the Gap Securities 
Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 287, 2 (1981). 
 
99 Cf. Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 459-60 (cited in note 98). 
 
plaintiffs or defendants) to exit from the lawsuit. This happens with the mechanism of opting-
out provided for classes certified under the rule 23(b)(3). 
 Even though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has disciplined solely in Rule 23 the 
procedure for either plaintiff or defendant class actions, they can not be treated identically as 
one being the mirror-image of the other one.100 There are many specifics that differ from each 
other’s angle. 
 Rule 23, in its current version, is much more elaborated than the past statutory ruel 
concerning representative suits in the United States. 
 A variety of details of the class action procedure and its effects is established in the 
Rule 23, in eight subdivisions (including those related to the requisites - 23(a), and, the types - 
23(b), of the class actions). 
 The subdivision 23(c) disciplines the timing and the elements for the class certification 
order; the appropriateness of notice and its contents; and, the judgments’ effect; subdivision 
23(d) is concerned with the orders in conduct of the actions; subdivision 23(e) is related to 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, and compromise; 23(f) deals with appeals; subdivision 23(g) 
provides for class counsel101; and, finally, subdivision 23(g) is about attorney fees award.102 
The provisions that define the requisites for certification and maintenance of a class 
action are stated in subdivision 23(a) and 23(b). In the following items, we are going to 
concisely scrutinize the referred rules under the standpoint of a defendant class action. 
 
a) Rule 23(a) Prerequisites for Certification of the Class Action. 
 
The 1966 Amendment to the Rule 23, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 
rewrote completely the rule in order to overcome major difficulties courts and commentators 
have realized in regard to the original version of 1938. 
 
100 See, Conte-Newberg, Newberg on class action, §4:46, 336, (cited in note 84); Debra J. Gross, 40 Emory L. J. 
611, 664 (cited in note 98). 
 
101 See, Part IV, D.2.(a), infra.
102 See, Part IV, D.2.(b), infra.
The Advisory Committee Note of 1966 Revision of the Rule 23 made a profound 
critique to the 1938 Rule 23103, and pointed out that the amended rule is “described in more 
practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions”. 
 Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites to every class action, either plaintiffs’ or 
defendants’: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and, adequate representation.104 
Concerning the firs requisite, the test stipulated by the statute is the impracticability of 
joinder of the whole members of the class due to its numerousness. There is not a minimum 
number of people which over that the class action procedure is authorized, once 
impracticability is not impossibility of joinder.105 The circumstances surrounding the case 
have to be examined in order to check the fulfillment of the numerosity requirement.106 
Although the number of the putative class is the primordial factor to certify a class 
action in relation to the numerosity requirement, one commentator has pointed out that a court 
shall considered for the impracticability of joinder other elements, such as: (i) judicial 
economy arising from avoiding multiple actions; (ii) the geographic dispersion of the class 
members; (iii) the financial resources of the class members; (iv) the claimants’ ability to 
institute individual suits (in plaintiff’s actions), and, we add, the defendants’ ability to 
individually defend themselves; and, (v) requests for prospective and injunctive relief that 
could affect future class members.107 
The standard is applied more flexibly to defendant class actions than plaintiffs’ one by 
reason of enhancing the collective litigation goal of judicial resources economy. It is more 
 
103 See, Part III, A.2.(c), note 93, supra.
104 Rule 23(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
 
105 A class has been certified with only thirteen defendant members (Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, 
Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534 – D.N.H. 1971), or, even twenty six defendants (Management Television System, Inc. v. 
National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162 – E.D. Pa. – 1971). 
 
106 See, for example, Town of New Castle v. Yonkers Contracting, 131 F.R.D. 38, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See, also, 
Notes, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action with a Public Official as the Named 
Representative, 9 Val. L. Rev. 357, 365 and n. 30, 366 and n. 31-3 (1974-1975); Comments, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 
283, 298 n. 72 (cited in note 59); Notes, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 633 n. 20 (cited in note 98). 
 
107 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23.22 (cited in note 74). 
likely that many individuals’ lawsuits may be brought in case of denial of certification of a 
defendant class, than it would occur with a plaintiff class action. In the latter case, just one or 
a few plaintiffs shall resort to an individual suit, after the class certification has been 
denied.108 
The second prerequisite of the Rule 23(a) is commonality of questions of law or fact to 
the class. Despite of the fact that the provision is in plural - “questions” - the objective of it is 
to obtain efficiency by collective adjudication and to protect absentees’ interests by solving, at 
least one, relevant nuclear question of law or fact.109 
Courts have not had much difficulty in asserting the commonality requirement110, but
rather have given it a cursory treatment because it figures to be superfluous or overlapped by 
other provisions of Rule 23(a) and (b).111 
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the case General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
has stated that commonality and typicality tend to merge together, and also with the requisite 
of adequate representation.112 
108 Conte-Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, §4:57, 370, (cited in note 84). See, also, See, Robert E. Holo, 
Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of the Rule 23 and a Proposed Solution 38 UCLA L. Rev. 228, 229 and 
nn. 24-7, (1990-1991). 
 
109 Baby Neal for & by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F. 3d 48, 56 (3rd Cir. 1994); Tecnograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. V. 
Method Electronics, 285 F. Supp. 714, 719 (N.D. Ill. - 1968); Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-Utility 
Expressways, 494 F. 2d. 126 (7th Cir. - 1974). See, also, 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23.23 (cited in note 74); 
Robert H. Klonoff, Class Action and other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell, 37 (West – 2004) (cited 
hereafter as Klonoff, Class Action in a Nutshell); Parsons and Starr, 4 Ecology L. Q. 881, 884-7 (cited in note 
98). 
 
110 See, Holo, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 228, 230 (cited in note 108). 
 
111 See, Notes, 9 Val. L. Rev. 357, 369 n. 40 (cited in note 106); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23.23 (cited in 
note 74). 
 
112 “The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for 
determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether 
the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be 
fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the 
adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns about the 
competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest. In this case, we need not address petitioner’s argument that 
there is a conflict of interest between respondent and the class of rejected applicants because an enlargement of 
the pool of Mexican-American employees will decrease respondent’s chances for promotion” (emphasis added);  
General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). 
 
The common questions of law or fact in a defendant class action may emerge out of 
the context, for example, of a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute enforced by 
several public officials. The constitutionality of the legal rule gives rise to an identical 
defense for all the class of public law enforcers. 
 Typicality is the third prerequisite to a class action and, according to the Supreme 
Court interpretation, tends to merger with commonality and adequate representation. 
 The optimal exam of the presence of this requisite is performed by the verification 
of the defense of the proposed class representative and the absence of conflictual interests 
with the class members. Further, the defenses for all class members should be grounded in 
the same legal theory.113 
In addition, a defense would lack typicality if it could only be applied to the class’ 
representative. Therefore, the defense shall be considered typical if it protects the interests 
of the putative members of the class, notwithstanding, “typicality does not require that the 
defenses be identical or perfectly coextensive; substantial similarity is sufficient” (cf. 
Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Association of Illinois, 97 F.R.D. 668, 678 
- 1983). 
 Another test for typicality is the so-called “juridical link” doctrine, emerged from 
the case La Mar v. H& B Novelty & Loan Co., positing that where the defendants are 
“juridically related in a manner that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be 
expeditious” the class action procedure should be applied.114 
The La Mar decision denied certification of a bilateral class action because the 
representative plaintiff has had relationship with only one defendant, and so he did not 
have cause of action against all the other defendants. Therefore, there was lack of typicality 
of claims. 
 
113 See, Conte-Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, §4:59, 373-4, (cited in note 84); Klonoff, Class Action in a 
Nutshell, 43 (cited in note 109); Notes, 9 Val. L. Rev. 357, 376 (cited in note 106); Comments, 33 UCLA L. 
Rev. 283, 303 (cited in note 59). 
 
114 489 F.2d. 461, 466 (9th Cir. - 1975). 
 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court asserted: “In brief, typicality is lacking when 
the representative plaintiff's cause of action is against a defendant unrelated to the 
defendants against whom the cause of action of the members of the class lies”.115 
The exceptions to the above explained theory, in accordance to the La Mar court, 
would be those “(…) in which all injuries are the result of a conspiracy or concerted 
schemes between the defendants at whose hands the class suffered injury”.116 Besides the 
existence of a conspiracy or a concerted scheme, other exception, as pointed out, is the 
presence of the “juridical link”.117 
Although it may be considered that the juridical link test establishes a higher 
standard of typicality, it is useful in the definition of the scope of a defendant class, and to 
protect the absent members by means of presenting typical defenses to the whole class.118 
The fourth prerequisite for certification of any class action is that “the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”. 
 The adequacy of representation is the most complex prerequisite and reveals the basis 
of the collective litigation, e.g., one or more persons litigating in the name of a crowd.119 
Accordingly, it is consistent with the due process of law clause, by which an 
individual can not be bound by a judgment where he was not a party to, or, had had an 
opportunity to intervene.120 
115 La Mar v. H& B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d. 461, 465 (9th Cir. - 1975). 
 
116 489 F.2d. 461, 466 (9th Cir. - 1975). For the application of the juridical link doctrine, see, Monaco v. Stone,
187 F.R.D. 50, 62 (D.C.NY. – 1999) (certifying defendant class); Barker v. FSC Securities Corp., 133 F.R.D. 
548, 553 (D.C. Ark. – 1989) (certifying defendant class); Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 654 (N.D. Ill. – 
1983) (certifying defendant class); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 690 (D.D.C. – 
1977) (certifying defendant class); Leer v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 172 F.R.D. 439, 447-9 (D. Wash. – 1997); 
Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527-8 (N.D. Ind. – 1975) (denying defendant class certification). 
 
117 See, generally, Note, The Juridical Links Exception to the Typicality Requirement in Multiple Defendant 
Class Actions: The Relationship between Standing and Typicality, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 492 (1978). 
 
118 Comments, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 283, 303-5 (cited in note 59). See, also, Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal 
Practice, §1770, 484-6 (cited in note 79); Conte-Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, §4:66, 401 (cited in note 
84). 
 
119 For different theories explaining the conception of representative lawsuits, see, e.g., Developments in the 
Law: Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1329-72 (cited in note 59); Fiss, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 21, 24-6 
(cited in note 34). 
 
120 See, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 
In a plaintiff class actions context, the Supreme Court has established that due process 
of law is observed when the interests of the class are duly represented by the named party: 
 
“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not present as 
parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately 
represented by parties who are present, or where they actually participate in the conduct 
of the litigation in which members of the class are present as parties, or where the 
interest of the members of the class, some of whom are present as parties, is joint, or 
where for any other reason the relationship between the parties present and those who 
are absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand in judgment for the latter. In 
all such cases, so far as it can be said that the members of the class who are present are, 
by generally recognized rules of law, entitled to stand in judgment for those who are 
not, we may assume for present purposes that such procedure affords a protection to the 
parties who are represented, though absent, which would satisfy the requirements of due 
process and full faith and credit”.121 (emphasis added and citations omitted) 
 
Particular questions concerning the adequate representative in defendant class actions, 
originate special analysis and “closer scrutiny” in order to ascertain if the named parties can 
actually protect, fairly and adequately, the interests of the entire class.122 
There are three foremost concerns related to the choice of adequate representative in 
defendant class actions: (i) the choice of the representative is made by the plaintiff; (ii) the 
absence of incentive for any defendant to bare the expenses of defending a lawsuit on behalf 
 
121 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-3 (1940). See, also, Management Television Systems, Inc. v. Nat’l Football 
League, 52 F.R.D. 162, 164-5 (E.D. Pa. – 1971) (defendant class action). 
 
122 Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1770, 476 (affirming “some special problems or questions have 
surfaced that require particular attention [to check the adequacy of the defendant representative] (cited in note 
79); Conte-Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, §4:66, 401 (cited in note 84); Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 
478 (affirming that “problems of adequacy are more serious in defendant class actions than in plaintiff class 
actions”) (cited in note 98); Comments, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Class Action in Patent Infringement 
Litigation, 7 Creighton L. Rev. 50, 59-60 (1973) (discussing the problems inherited to defendant class in patent 
litigation context); Theodore W. Anderson and Harry J. Hoper, Limiting Relitigation by Defendant Class Actions 
from Defendants Viewpoint, 4 Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 200 (1970-1971) (urging the parties and the courts for 
special considerations about class representatives in defendant actions); Kalven and Rosenfield, 8 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 684, 697 n. 39 (cited in note 93). 
 
of the entire class when the costs of litigation are disproportionate to the representative party’s 
stake; (iii) the difficulty to compensate class counsel for the benefits conferred upon the class. 
 It is very well known the phrase of Professor Chaffee Jr. that: “It is a strange situation 
where one side picks out the generals for the enemy’s army”, implying that the plaintiff would 
select a weak representative for the defendant class.123 
However, the plaintiff’s choice of an incapable class representative shall be challenged 
by any absent members, fact that would jeopardize a favorable adjudication to the plaintiff.124 
Likewise, the court has a broad power to conduct the action (Rule 23(d)) in order to 
maintain the class action procedure “fair and efficient”, as affirmed in the Advisory 
Committee Notes.  
 Hence, the court may replace the class representative in circumstances where he does 
not prosecute vigorously the class defense, or, has a conduct in conflict with the class 
interests. Also, the court may permit intervention of a new representative in addition to the 
current one, or, just designate another person to represent the class.  
 Similarly to the appointment of an interim class counsel (Rule 23(g)(2)(A)), the same 
procedure may be adopted in relation to the class representative, moreover, in defendant class 
actions where the indication had been made by the plaintiff.125 
The other two problems involve directly the incentives for the class attorney to assume 
the lawsuit. Only economy of scale in investment in the lawsuit can overcome the problem of 
the reluctance of defendants to assume the litigation as class representative. This objective is 
achieved with incentives for the class counsel through an optimal mechanism of 
compensation for his performance.126 
b) Rule 23(b) Maintenance of the Class Action. 
 
123 Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 237 (cited on note 56). 
 
124 See, Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 478-82 (cited in note 98). 
 
125 Cf. MCL, 4th, §21.26, 277. See, In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio – 1997); 
Shankroff v. Advest, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 190 (S.D. N.Y. – 1986). 
 
126 See, Part IV, A and D, infra.
The prerequisites of the Rule 23(a) are a necessary condition to each and every class 
action, either of plaintiffs’ or defendants’, or, even bilateral suit, but they are not a sufficient 
condition to the maintenance of a collective litigation. 
 In this section we are going to focus on the additional elements described in Rule 
23(b), that have to be fulfilled for the use of the defendant class action, and which give rise to 
distinct types of class actions, on account of diverse objectives of each one.127 
Defendant class actions have been certified under all the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). It 
is noteworthy that, recently, one commentator has stressed out the lack of solid doctrinal 
bases for class action categories specified in Rule 23(b), blurring them together and 
promoting its manipulation by litigants and courts.128 
The class actions regulated in subdivisions 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are considered to be 
mandatory, that is, every member of the class shall be bound by the judgment. Consequently, 
there is no option to the class members to be excluded from the lawsuit. 
 The rationale is to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments in relation to the parties, 
creating incompatible standards of conducts, or, the possibility of impairment or impediment 
to some of the class members to exercise or protect their interest, should individuals’ lawsuits 
be filed. 
 
127 Rule 23(b) – Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites 
of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:  
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be 
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede 
their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; 
or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of 
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and 
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) 
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
 
128 Linda Mullenix, New Millenium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 177, 185, 
214-38, 243-6 (2003). 
 
For this exactly reason, Professor Kaplan has denominated as “natural” or 
“necessary”, classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).129 It is necessary or natural that 
people in equal circumstances should be treated equally. Otherwise, the principle of justice 
and the courts themselves would be disrespected. Those elements, in certain way, describe the 
provisions for necessary joinder of parties stated in Rule 19, of the Fed. Rule of Civ. P.130 
The avoidance of incompatible adjudication of rights, among individuals placed in the 
same situation, is one of the goals of the class actions. 
 Defendant class actions have been certified in both subdivisions 23(b)(1)(A) and 
23(b)(1)(B). 
 Certification of defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is made in order to impose a 
compatible pattern of conduct to the to the plaintiff in relation to the defendants.  
 The objective of the provision is to try to avoid inconsistent or varying adjudications 
with respect to individual defendant. The reason is that multiple lawsuits, instead of one 
collective procedure, would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party 
opposing the class (that means, to the plaintiff). 
 The functional utility of 23(b)(1)(A) defendant class actions has been remarked in 
patent infringement cases, due offensive collateral estoppel doctrine conceived by the 
Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc., v. University of Illinois Foundation.131 
In such a case, the judicial decree of invalidity of a patent could be used as collateral estoppel 
against the original plaintiff in any other future suit.132 
Anyhow, some authorities have decided that there is not an incompatible standard of 
conduct if a “plaintiff patent-holder may be required to act differently with respect to different 
parties if the validity of its patent is upheld in one case and rejected in another, the plaintiff 
would not be subjected to incompatible standards of conduct. Incompatibility would exist 
 
129 Kaplan, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 386 (cited in note 93). 
 
130 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 Colum L 
Rev 1254, 1259-60 (1961). 
 
131 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See, also, Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 474 and n. 72, 475 and n. 74 (cited in note 
98). 
 
132 See, the application of the offensive collateral estoppel in securities context: Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 
only if one court order permitted the enforcement of the patent against an alleged infringer 
and another court order prohibited the enforcement of the patent against that same alleged 
infringer. The party opposing the class would not have to violate one judgment in order to 
satisfy another judgment”.133 
It seems that this interpretation is in conflict with the express provision of the statutes, 
and also its goal, notwithstanding, being illogical. The legal rule is based on the logic law of 
the excluded middle (tertium non datur): either the patent is valid and enforceable against 
everyone, or, it is invalid and unenforceable to everybody; there is not a third option. This is 
the reason that the subject matter “necessarily” has to be decided in a homogenous way to the 
whole class of alleged patent infringer. The incompatible standard of conduct to the plaintiff 
would occur if, at the same time, the patent could be enforced and could not be enforced. 
 Defendant class actions have also have been certified, under the subdivision 
23(b)(1)(A), in securities litigation context.134 
The Rule 23(b)(1)(B) contemplates defendant class actions because the prosecution of 
separate actions against individual members, while not technically concluding the other 
members, might do so as a practical matter. Here, there is not a risk of inconsistent 
adjudications due to separate suits; rather, without the class action procedure, absent class 
members shall have their interests impaired or impeded. 
 The Advisory Committee Note has expressly affirmed the utilization of class actions 
by or against representative members, under the theory of “limited fund”: “In various 
situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class will necessarily or probably 
have an adverse practical effect on the interests of other members who should therefore be 
represented in the lawsuit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous 
persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. A class action by or against 
representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed 
 
133 Cf. 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, §23.41 (cited in note 74); Winder Licensing, Inc. v. King Instrument Corp.,
130 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ill. - 1990); Webcraft Technologies, Inc. v. Alden Press., Inc. 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182 
(N.D. Ill. – 1985). 
 
134 See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 528 (S.D. Fla. – 1986); Weinberger v. Jackson,
102 F.R.D. 839 (N.D. Cal. – 1984); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal. – 1982); In re Itel 
Sec. Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. – 1981). But, compare, In re Seagate Technologies Sec. Litigation, 115 
F.R.D. 264 (N.D. Cal. – 1987). 
 
by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund, 
meets the problem”. 
 Nonetheless, defendant classes have been certified in “limited fund” cases in very 
special circumstances, once it is rare that defendants are seeking money from a fund as it is 
usual to plaintiff classes. 
 The first one concerns interpleader defendant classes where, for example, the plaintiff 
seeks to distribute funds from trust to the defendants.135 The second situation is related to a 
“common fund” from insurance policies for professional liability. Here, separate lawsuits 
against the partners may drains the common policy, making those that are prosecuted in the 
future to bare their own court’s adjudication and litigation costs.136 
In another circumstance, courts have certified defendants classes, based on Rule 
23(b)(1)(B), in litigations concerning property rights.137 
Rule 23(b)(2) primary concern is with the type of relief sought. The intention is to 
provide final injunctive or declaratory relief as the rule states: “the party opposing the class 
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class 
as a whole”. 
 The Advisory Committee Notes explained that the subdivision is not intended to cases 
where the plaintiff is, “exclusively or predominantly”, seeking money damages. 
 Some courts have interpreted literally the Rule 23(b)(2), asserting that “the party 
opposing the class” should be understand as the defendant opposing the plaintiffs’ class, 
hence precluding defendant class actions.138 
135 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. Alpert, 163 F.R.D. 409 (S.D. NY. – 1995); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. 
Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. – 1968). See, also, Notes, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 634 n. 22 (cited in note 98). 
 
136 See, e.g., In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litigation, 912 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Pa. – 1995); Alexander Grant & Co. v. 
McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583 (S.D. Ohio - 1987). 
 
137 See, e.g., Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, 97 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. N.Y. - 1983); 
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D. 627 (N.D. N.Y. - 1981); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 85 
F.R.D. 701 (N.D. N.Y. – 1980). 
 
138 See, e.g., Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. – 2003); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Midland Bancor,
158 F.R.D. 681 (D. Kansas – 1994); Henson v. East Lincoln Tonwship, 814 F. 2d. 410 (7th Cir. – 1987). 
 
This construction is not in accordance to the provision of Rule 23, where in many 
subdivisions expressly prescribe for both plaintiff and defendant, such as: 23(a); 23(a)(3); 
23(b)(1); 23(b)(3); and, 23(d). 
 Some commentators have considered “party” as the plaintiff’s class, collectively, in 
the context of bilateral civil rights litigation.139 Another has argued that the useful approach to 
certified defendant class actions is to employ the “juridical link test”.140 It seems correct that 
the singular reference to “party” in Rule 23 should normally be construed as also including 
the plural unless expressly provided in the contrary.141 
The most relevant domain of law that defendant class actions have been certified, 
under Rule 23(b)(2), is pertaining to civil rights.142 But there are cases involving housing or 
property rights143, government benefits144, and sex discrimination145.
The 23(b)(3) class action principal difference from the preceding ones is the 
mechanism for members of the class to opt out of the litigation, obviating the binding effect 
of the aggregate judgment. Therefore, it is said this type of class actions “is not particularly 
suited to defendant classes, because members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes have the right to opt 
out of a class judgment”.146 
Notwithstanding, defendant class actions have been certified under Rule 23(b)(3).147 
139 Comments, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 283, 305 (cited in note 98); Note, Class Standing and the Class 
Representative, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1651 (1980). 
 
140 Note, Certification of Defendant Class Actions under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1371 (1984). 
 
141 Cf. Conte-Newberg, Newberg on class action, §4:66, 398 (cited in note 84). 
 
142 See, e.g., Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2nd Cir. – 1979); United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. 
Supp. 314 (E.D. Texas – 1988); McKay v. County Election Comm'rs, 158 F.R.D. 620 (E.D. Ark – 1994). 
 
143 Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance v. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 69 F.R.D. 633 
(N.D. Ill. – 1976). 
 
144 Luyando v. Bowen, 124 F.R.D. 52 (S.D. N.Y. – 1989). 
 
145 Kane v. Fortson, 369 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ga. – 1973). 
 
146 Conte-Newberg, Newberg on class action, §4:67, 405 (cited in note 84). But, compare, Note, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. 630, 635 (cited in note 98). 
 
147 See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F. 3d. 473, (2nd Cir. - 1995); Alvarado Partners, 
L.P., v. Mehta, 130 F.R.D. 528 (D. Colo. – 1990); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 528 (S.D. 
Fla. – 1986); In re Gap Stores Securities Litigation, 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. – 1978); Williams, 89 F.R.D. 287, 
294 (cited in note 98). 
In this sense, evidence that opting out of a defendant class action would make 
everyone worse off (members that opt-out; members that stay in, and, plaintiffs), has been 
produced throughout this work. 
 The Advisory Committee Note asserted that the last type of class action prescribed in 
the Rule 23(b)(3) “encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies 
of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly 
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results”. 
 A defendant class action should be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), if common 
questions predominate over the questions affecting individual members, and the collective 
procedure is superior than any other methods to deal with the case, so that it ought to confer 
“fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”.148 
IV. The Optimal Aggregation of Defendants 
 
A. Exploiting Investment and Economy Scales in the Aggregation of Defenses 
 
As we have argued, optimal law enforcement system to confer individuals’ ideal well-
being is only achieved by aggregation of claims and defenses. 
 It is true that separate litigation, i.e., case-by-case litigation, precludes economy of 
scale for the plaintiffs, undermining deterrence and compensation functions of the law. Only 
mandatory aggregation of claims breaks the asymmetric advantage that defendants have over 
plaintiffs, which skews adjudication in favor of the former.149 
Also, the lack of aggregation of defendants precludes the plaintiff, in a single class 
action, to obtain adjudication of liability against several wrongdoers, for instance, in case of 
various environmental polluters firms. 
 So far, the advantages of defendant class action are not limited to the plaintiffs bar. It 
is our understanding that the defendant class action is operational, functional, either for 
 
148 See, Weinstein, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 433, 438-54 (cited in note 93). 
 
149 Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 27 (cited in note 21). 
 
plaintiffs or defendants. The same phenomenon that affects plaintiffs, in most of the mass tort 
litigation, where a defective design of a product or service, provided by a firm, affect 
innumerous victims, may be present within a dispersed class of defendants threatened with 
nuisance value suits by one or more plaintiffs. 
 Alba Conte and Herbert Newberg have challenged the general assertion that 
Rule23(b)(3) is unsuitable to defendant class actions, because the high probability of 
numerous members opting out of the class: 
 
“In fact, some circumstances will actually create incentives not to opt out of a defendant 
class. For example, a plaintiff who commences a defendant class against a group of 
underwriters of a new stock offering may also threaten and be able to commence 
litigation against each of the underwriters individually. Given the certainty of having to 
make a choice between remaining in a defendant class or defending individual 
litigation, the economics of a joint defense considerably outweigh those of defending an 
individual action, and defendant class members would have an incentive to remain in 
the class”.150 
Despite of the validity of the argument, our proposal moves further urging that the 
optimal economy of scale for investment in litigation requires the compulsory reunion of the 
defendants and their defenses.151 
It is a general consensus that the primary advantage of class actions is to override the 
transactional cost of low stakes claims, which would not be individually prosecuted because 
the costs of litigation (process and judicial expenses and attorney’s fees) supersede the 
expected utility from the adjudication.152 
150 Newberg on Class Actions, §4:62, 385 (cited in note 84). See, also, Part III, B.1.(b), supra.
151 See, Holo, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 223, 266 (cited in note 108) (proposing an alteration of Rule 23, of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in order to prohibit defendant members from opting out of the class action, 
nevertheless, without further theoretical rationale). 
 
152 See, generally, Developments in the Law – Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1355-9 (cited in note 59). 
 
Nevertheless, there are some criticisms against this position asserting that, instead of 
promoting judicial and process economy, class action increases litigation. Various arguments 
shall evidence to the contrary. 
 The first refusal arises from the lack of parameter of comparison and thus statistics to 
justify the assertion that the level of filing suits increments due to class actions, in detriment 
of promoting economy of judicial resources.153 
In addition, the deterrent effect of the law multiplies with the amplified probability of 
filing a lawsuit. Consequently, there is a decrescent number of individuals engaging in the 
violation of the law, that would give rise to potential lawsuits.154 
Secondly, the critique passes by the fact that collective litigation of low stakes claims, 
operates the deterrent function of the law, besides compensation.155 Wrongdoers will not take 
appropriate steps to prevent harm if they are aware that, due to transactional costs, it is unlike 
that the victims will bring lawsuits against them. This situation evidences that, 
notwithstanding the size of the stake of the claim, the absence of vindication produces an 
under-deterrence effect. 
 Thirdly, and the most important reasoning is that this argument seems to be eluding 
that judicial economy is just one of the principles that guides collective litigation. 
 Although class action has at one time multiples goals: equilibrate the parties in 
litigation; access to justice; deterrence or policing behaviors; and, avoidance of incompatible 
adjudication, in some situations, an order of priority has to be established. 
 That does not mean that the other goals are to be unconsidered. The goals of 
aggregation of claims and defenses are principles that north the enhancement of the law, 
therefore, all have the same strength or status, and no one shall eliminate the other. However, 
in some circumstances, one goal has to bestow prominence to another. 
 
153 See, John Coffee Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum L. Rev. 1343, 1347 
(1995). 
 
154 Professor Posner states: “The likelier a suit is, the greater is the deterrent effect of whatever legal principle the 
suit would enforce, and hence the less likely the potential defendants to engage in the forbidden conduct that 
would create a right to sue”, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 585 (cited in note 24). 
 
155 See, Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 30 n. 24 (cited in note 21); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 
586-7 (cited in note 24); Kalven and Rosenfield, 8 U Chi. L. Rev. 684, 686 (cited in note 93). 
 
If there is a conflict within the goals of the collective litigation the preference for an 
optimal law enforcement system must select which one should prevail: in our view the access 
to justice takes primacy, preponderating over judicial economy.156 
In relation to high stake claims, it is argued the importance of allowing class members 
to opt-out of the lawsuit certified under the Rule 23(b)(3). By definition, high stake claims are 
those that would be individually viable, albeit the existence of class action procedures. 
 This line of reasoning follows the “anti-redistribution principle” (expression created 
by Professor Rosenberg), that has been established by the Supreme Court in Amchem v. 
Windsor157, which “determines the “fairness” of using Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve claims by trial 
or settlement”.158 
Briefly, the “fairness test” requires that class members recoveries, with high stake 
claims, should reflect their expected value claims, under the separate action market, therefore, 
justifying the opting-out of the class.159 
Anyhow, the marketability of a claim in a separate action, instead of in a collective 
procedure, takes into consideration, others, and more important, factors, as litigation costs, 
and, litigation risks, both measured in accordance to types and difficulty of proof; complexity 
of the law; the facts and related public policies etc.160 
At this point is important to remember that allowing individuals to alter to ex post 
preferences, that are diametrical opposite and mutually exclusive to their previous choices ex 
ante, disrupts the optimal legal system for law enforcement, undermining the deterrence 
 
156 See, Jones, Theory of Class Actions, 82-3 (cited in note 35). 
 
157 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 
158 Id., 22. See, also, Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 838 (cited in note 21). 
 
159 See, excerpt of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure: “(…) 
the second opt-out opportunity gives class members the same opportunity to accept or reject a proposed 
settlement as persons enjoy in individual law suits. This proposal introduces a measure of class-member self-
determination and control that best harmonizes the class action with traditional litigation. (…) [a] second opt-out 
opportunity could relieve individuals from the unforeseen consequences of inaction or decisions made at the time 
of certification, when limited meaningful information was available. The proposed second opt-out opportunity 
may provide added assurance to the supervising court that a settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. It is just 
the sort of “structural assurance of fairness”, mentioned in Amchem Products Inc., that permits class actions in 
the first place”, Report, 8, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1202/ExcerptCV.pdf (last visited on 
May, 3rd, 2006). 
 
160 Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 838 n.19 (cited in note 21). 
objective of collective adjudication and increasing litigation costs and risks, and, does not 
provide any increased benefits for compensation.161 
Other aspect of transactional costs of litigation that commentators have given very 
little attention, or even better, its total lack of analysis, is of aggregation of low stakes 
defenses. 
 The deficiency of fully exploiting investment and economy scales in litigation, due to 
fractional aggregation is not an event that exclusively plaintiff’s incur. 
 Even in a situation of dispersed plaintiffs, filing multiple individual lawsuits, the 
absence of mast tying as in mandatory class action, impedes the defendant to maximize his 
economy and investment in litigation.162 
In certain circumstances, the defendant can invest once and for all, as preparing 
experts’ opinions or depositions. However, in others, several and overlapping lawsuits may 
provoke a substantial increment of coordination costs. This augment is a result of the 
managing costs for several actions, throughout different jurisdictions, employing different 
lawyers or law firms, with varied experts, incurring in increased expenses with transportation 
and accommodations for witnesses etc.163 
Moreover, the situation is more acute when there are innumerous dispersed 
defendants, with common defenses, either facing a plaintiff class action or multiple individual 
lawsuits. Mandatory aggregation of defendants confers optimal scale of investment and 
economy with optimal incentives to class representative as well as the class counsel. 
 Any violation or abuse of the law has to be rectified, and the value of adjudication 
functions either in favor of prospective plaintiffs or of defendants.164 
161 See, Part II, B, supra.
162 See, Part II, C, supra.
163 Professor Rosenberg points out that even firms with close and long-standing pre-litigation commercial 
relationships incur in high expenses in coordination of actions, as for example the Firestone Tire/Ford Explore 
litigation. He adds that courts can impose the aggregation of defendants, in a defendant class action, “to 
overcome collective action problems and costs that prevent multiple defendants from fully exploiting scale 
economies, thereby promoting defendants’ optimal investment in developing shared positions on common 
questions”, Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 28 n. 22 (cited in note 21). 
 
164 See, Assaf Hamdani and Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 685, 708-9 (2005). 
 
In an optimal law enforcement system, it is not socially and individually desirable that 
claims or defenses are not vindicated for the sole reason of litigation transactional costs, 
which makes economically unviable to file a lawsuit or to present a legal defense.165 
Ideal welfare to individuals is obtained with economy of scale in investment in 
litigation. Aggregation of claims and defenses confers the ideal investment either for plaintiffs 
or defendants, in collectivized procedures. It is irrelevant the dimension of the claims at stake: 
either low or high. Further, it is functional indifferent if the lawsuit concerns to a class of 
plaintiffs or defendants, or both. Even more, it is operational meaningless, for the best law 
enforcement, if the purpose of the certification of a defendant class action serves the interests 
of the plaintiffs or of the defendants.166 
B. Nuisance Value Suits 
 
The defendant class action is more frequently used as a procedural device for the 
plaintiffs. However, it is a strong instrument to avoid nuisance value lawsuits to be used by 
defendants, creating a class action in individual lawsuits brought by plaintiffs. 
 Nuisance value suits, or negative value suits, may be put into a model design described 
as a lawsuit where the expected benefits of litigation would be outweighed by its costs.167 
Further, it is a model of litigation where there is a presumptively small cost for the 
plaintiff to bring the suit, and a relatively high cost for the defendant to defend himself.168 
165 For example, several clients do not file lawsuits in order to be refunded of illegal banking charges, or, 
numerous individuals prefers to settle when threatened with nuisance value suits alleging television signal piracy 
despite of the fact that they had not commit any violation or have a consistent defense. 
 
166 As we have continuously sustained that the defendant class actions may serve either the interests of a class of 
plaintiffs or a class of defendants. See, also, Part IV, B, C, D, infra.
167 Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 420 (cited in note 25). 
 
168 Id., 422. See, also, Randy J. Kozel and David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1849, (2004) (defining nuisance-value settlement as “a payoff 
extracted by a threat to litigate meritless claim or defense that both parties know the court would readily dismiss 
as ‘untriable’ or otherwise legally untenable on an applicable dispositive motion for merits review, like a motion 
for summary judgment”, and, proposing a mandatory summary judgment to resolve it). 
 
So, in a lawsuit characterized as a nuisance value suit, the plaintiff will likely file the 
action, but unlikely will go to trial, and, the defendant will probably settle for any amount 
inferior to his costs to present a defense. 
 The situation is better illustrated with numeric examples, furnished by David 
Rosenberg and Steven Shavell.169 
Imagine, for example number one, a plaintiff that has a low expected utility from a 
judgment corresponding to 1% of $1,000. His cost to file a lawsuit is only $30 and an 
additional cost of $150 if he goes to trial. On the other side, the defendant would bear a $200 
to present his defense. 
 As we have sketched the case, the plaintiff is willing to file the lawsuit as its cost is 
very low. In doing so, the defendant is facing an expense of $200 to defend himself. 
Therefore, he is willing to settle for any amount bellow his litigation costs. 
 The outcome is the defendant settling with the plaintiff in order to avoid the cost of the 
defense. He realizes an expected utility from settlement in comparison to higher costs of 
litigating the case. 
 The plaintiff is also looking for a settlement, as he is unwilling to go to trial because 
the case is weak and the cost of trial ($150) supersedes the adjudication of the judgment (1% 
of $1,000 = 10). The filling expenses are a sunk cost that he does not care anymore at this 
phase of the procedure.170 We are assuming that the plaintiff is risk-neutral or risk-averse, but 
not a bluffer to try to risk a chance of the defendant choosing to litigate instead of settling. In 
this case, the amount for settling has to be one that gives the plaintiff certainty that the 
defendant will agree with, so the value has to be any value inferior to $200. Also, it is 
irrelevant for the settlement if the defendant has information about the strength of the 
plaintiff’s case, considering that the amount for settlement is going to be less than the defense 
cost. 
 
169 David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5
Internat. Rev. Law and Econ. 3, 4-6 (1985). See, also, Lucian Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the 
Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1996) (arguing that legal costs are not incurred at 
once but in stages and this divisibility increases the likelihood of plaintiffs to sue or threat to sue defendants, 
even if the costs of litigation, at the beginning of the litigation, exceeds the expected judgment amount). 
 
170 See, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7 (cited in note 24). 
 
Any other conduct of the parties would be irrational. If the defendant does not settle 
nor appears in court to defend himself, he will loose of $1,000 by a default judgment. If the 
defendant litigates, he would bear a cost of $200, instead of a settlement agreement for any 
amount below this. The plaintiff, on the other hand, would probably withdraw the case and 
avoid spending more $150 at trial for an expected judgment of only $10. 
 We emphasize that the mere threat of filling a lawsuit is enough to obtain the 
settlement, because the threat is verisimilar under an economic analysis, hence making the 
plaintiff eager to bring the action in case an out-of-court settlement is not reached. 
 Assume another example, where the plaintiff has a high expected utility from the 
judgment, corresponding to 70% of $300, with a trial cost of $250. The costs for filling the 
suit and the defense remain the same, respectively, $30 and $200. There is no qualitatively 
difference from the first example, because the defendant would settle for any value inferior to 
the amount of his litigation costs ($200). On the plaintiff’s side, he would be willing to file 
the suit if he does not get an out-of-court settlement (costs of only $25). But also, he does not 
want to go to trial even possessing a merit case, once the trial costs ($250) overcome the 
expected adjudication of $210 (70% of $300 = $210). 
 According to the adopted definition, situations where the plaintiff has a merit case, 
with high expectation from the judgment that overrides the costs of litigation, making him 
eager to go to trial, would not be considered a nuisance value suit.171 
The above assertions were made focused in the individual lawsuits. On cases where 
there are innumerous and dispersed defendants, there is a major incentive for the 
collectivization of the defenses, in order to achieve economy of scale to invest in the litigation 
instead of settle in a negative value suit. 
 Assume that a plaintiff is suing or threatening to sue 100 people to obtain nuisance-
value settlements. Suppose these figures for each individual litigation: (i) $500 - costs to file 
each suit; (ii) $1,500 – trial costs; (iii) $4,000 – defense costs; (iv) $2,000 – plaintiff’s offer to 
settle; (v) 1% of 100,000 = $1,000 - expected judgment. 
 As we have argued, any single defendant would rather settle than litigate, even though 
the plaintiff has a weak or meritless case. Anyhow, aggregating all defendants, considering 
 
171 See example at Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Internat. Rev. Law and Econ. 3, 5 (cited in note 169). 
 
that the above numbers maintained unchanged, the cost per-defendant is $40, what incentives 
the defendants not to settle, but rather litigate. 
 Regardless of the fact that defendant class actions are more frequently used for 
plaintiffs, and on their own interests, the goals of collective litigation – access to justice, 
equilibrium within the parties in litigation; deterrence or policing behaviors; and, avoidance of 
incompatible adjudication - are also achieved by the defendants’ requirement for aggregation 
of the their class. 
 In Otero v. New York City House Authority, the district court filed an order permitting 
the intervention of 171 defendants, that moved for a defendant class action, which was 
certificate due impracticability of joinder, common questions at law, and, typicality of 
claims.172 
This precedent evidences, although rare, that a defendant is allowed to move for 
certification of a class, which should reach optimal economy of scale in litigation by 
forbidding members to opt-out of the class.173 
Alternatively, the defendants may step upfront and file, with the exactly same 
advantages, a class action for declaratory and or injunctive relieves. 
 For example in the DirecTV case174, a class of consumers filed a class action lawsuit 
against DirecTV, claiming that the satellite television provider violated the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961-1968, by mailing 
demand letters that accused plaintiffs of illegally accessing the provider's signal. The U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the action on the basis that the 
provider's sending of the letters was conduct immunized from RICO liability under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. In upholding the trial court's judgment, the U. S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that RICO and the predicate statutes at issue did not permit the 
maintenance of a lawsuit for the sending of a prelitigation demand to settle legal claims that 
did not amount to a sham. Because the demand letters at issue sought settlement of claims 
 
172 354 F Supp 941, 945 and n.7 (1973). 
 
173 See, Part II, C, supra.
174 See, Part I. 
 
against plaintiffs under the Federal Communications Act, and no sham was claimed, they 
could not form the basis of liability under RICO).175 
A different use of defendant class action was employed in Georgia Power Co. v. 
Hudson176, where the plaintiff, a public service company that operated a power dam, filed a 
suit to enjoin the prosecution by defendants, owner of lands lying along the river below the 
dam, of a number of actions for damages based on the plaintiff’s operation of the dam 
overflowing bottom lands, instituted by the defendants against the plaintiff in several state 
courts.177 In a certain manner, the objective was to consolidate all the land owners’ actions 
brought in state courts into a federal court, what even up today is not possible.178 
Completely diverse from our line of argumentation, concerning the aggregation of 
defendants and their common defenses, it is the possibility that a single defendant, in a 
plaintiff class action, file a counterclaim creating a defendant class action (or more precisely a 
bilateral class action). The counterclaim, as is the proper name of the institute indicates, is a 
“pleading which sets forth a claim for relief” (Rule 8(a), Fed. R. of Civ. P.), which discipline 
is established in Rule 13, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.179 
175 Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F. 3d 923 (2006). 
 
176 49 F 2d 66 (4th Cir. - 1931). 
 
177 The suit has been dismissed based on three different grounds: failure to meet the jurisdictional amount 
requirement; federal courts were forbidden by statute (28 USCA §379) to enjoin state court actions; and,  federal 
court of equity has no jurisdiction, for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, to enjoin the prosecution of 
such actions, irrespective of the court in which they are pending (note that the decision is dated before the 
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that unified procedures in law and at equity, see, Part III, 
A.2.(c)). 
 
178 There is not a procedural mechanism, as the Multidistrict Litigation Panel – MDL, that allows coordination of 
federal civil cases and reunion of them for united discovery, under the 28 U.S.C. §1407. See, Klonoff, Class 
Action in a Nutshell, 371 et. seq. (cited in note 109). In the MCL 4th, §20.31, 230, is stated: “No single forum has 
jurisdiction over these groups of cases. Unless the defendant files for bankruptcy, no legal basis exists for 
exercising exclusive federal control over state litigation. Interdistrict, intradistrict, and multidistrict transfer 
statutes and rules apply only to cases filed in, or removable to, federal court”. 
 
179 See, e.g., Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981); Jones v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 68 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. La. 1975); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.NY. 
1972). 
 
Under the procedural angle, the defendant class action initiated by requirement of a 
defendant follows the same pattern of any class action concerning the requisites of Rule 23(a) 
and Rule 23(b).180 
The key element is the mandatory aggregation of defendants, that would halve the 
asymmetric advantage of plaintiff’s litigation, conferring the defendants scale advantage in 
economy and investment, what would result in marketable defense, incentivizing class 
counsel to assume the defense. 
 
C. The Individuals’ Well-Being and the “Fairness” of a Day in Court 
 
There is an idea scattered spread amongst legal operators that collectivized litigation 
and individuals’ rights in conducting a civil action comprehend antagonist concepts. 
 Corresponding to this belief, the Supreme Court established that the parties, in 
mandatory class actions, carry the burden to justify the exception to the individuals’ fairness 
of having a day in court, which is a “deep-rooted historic tradition”: 
 
“ ‘Second, and no less important, mandatory class actions aggregating damages claims 
implicate the due process “principle of general application in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which 
he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process”, Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 85 L. Ed. 22, 61 S. Ct. 115 (1940), it being 
“our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court’ ” 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762, 104 L. Ed. 2d 835, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (9189) (quoting 
18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, p. 417 
(1981)); see Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798-799, 135 L. Ed. 2d 76, 
116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996). Although “we have recognized an exception to the general rule 
 
180 The defendant class action, certified on behalf of the defendant requirement, is superior to mandatory joinder, 
because this is impractical when the number of defendants is extent, and does not need any drastic modification 
of actual statutes. For proposal of mandatory joinder in patent litigation, see, Edward Hsieh, Mandatory Joinder: 
An Indirect Method for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 683 (2003-2004); see, also, a comparison 
between consolidation under multidistrict litigation panel and class action, Charles Silver, Comparing Class 
Action and Consolidations, 10 Rev. Litig. 495 (1990-1991). 
 
when, in certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests 
adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party,” or “where a 
special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by 
nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate,” Martin, supra, at 762, n. 2 
(citations omitted), the burden of justification rests on the exception”.181 
Correspondently, as the argument goes, individuals should have the right to opt-out of 
class actions and individually litigate their claims and defenses. 
 Rhetorical as it is this “historical tradition” of an individual right of a day in court182,
one commentator has even gone further affirming that the day in court is based on “natural 
law”: 
 
“Underlying our tradition of individual claim autonomy in substantial tort cases is the 
natural law notion that this is an important personal right of the individual”.183 
Another scholar, while criticizing the “natural and inalienable” right of individual 
conduction of process in contrast to collectivized procedure, as “somewhat embarrassing”, 
 
181 Ortiz v. Fiberbroad Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2314-5 (1999). 
 
182 For a profound an extensive critique of the “fairness of a day in court”, see, Fried and Rosenberg, Making 
Tort Law, 27-31 (cited in note 21); Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 44-7, 49-55 (cited in note 21) 
(demonstrating the lack of deontological justification for opt-out in mass tort litigation, which would be based on 
satisfaction due to a right-duty relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim); Rosenberg, 115 Harv. L. 
Rev. 831, 863-6 (cited in note 21) (arguing that court-award fee to class counsel based on opportunity cost of 
class settlement is more cost effective than “autonomy” in order to solve the supposed collusion in class’ 
settlements); Rosenberg, 69 B.U.L. L. Rev. 695, 701-3 (cited in note 21) (demonstrating the absence of meaning 
in individual control of the litigation). See, also, Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An 
Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307, 389 et. seq. (1994) (challenging the process value of allowing 
individuals to be heard); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193, 199, 288 (1992) (arguing that the justification of a day in court is based on a process-
oriented theory “that values participation for its own sake not just for its tendency to improve outcome quality” 
and concludes that “the assumption basic to the conventional account of the day in court ideal – that each person 
has an individual right to control her own lawsuit – is wrong on positive and normative grounds”). 
 
183 Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trial in Mass Tort Cases: a Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 74 (1989). 
 
still purports the “popular presupposition of individual dignity, and its political counterpart, 
self-determination”.184 
The assertion that the “first purpose of our civil justice system is and should be to offer 
corrective justice in disputes arising between private parties”185 fails to consider that any law 
provision should enhance two functions, in this order: deterrence and compensation. As a 
result, an optimal legal system should favor deterrence of unreasonable risks and 
compensation solely for reasonable risks.186 
Even the argument that “our system operates mainly on the assumption that economic 
decisions are best made by the true owner of property rather than by any other person”187,
supposedly an economic one, does not suffice. The economics decisions, in modern society, 
are made by experts in managing individuals’ assets, such as it happens in corporations, 
governments, trade unions, investment funds, companies foundations’ funds, life insurance 
policies etc, as noted by Professor Craig Jones.188 
Of significant importance is the fact that, in most of the tort law cases, lawyers assume 
the risks of litigation, evidenced by contingent fees. Statistics demonstrate that 90% of tort 
litigation, individual or collectivized, are governed by contingent attorney fees’ agreements.189 
Litigation strategies under contingent fees arrangements are made on the lawyer’s 
assessment of expected gains and losses, hence, he will only bring a suit if the expected value 
to him is positive.190 
184 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Elridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 49 (1976-1977). See, also, Richard A. 
Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the Ali Proposal, 10 J. L. & Com. 1 
(1990-1991); Patricia Anne Solomon, Are Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional? 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1627 (1996-1997). 
 
185 Id., 74. 
 
186 See, Part II, C, supra.
187 Transgrud, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 75 (cited in note 183). 
 
188 Jones, Theory of Class Actions, 74 (cited in note 35). 
 
189 Rosenberg, 62 Ind. L. J. 561, 582 (cited in note 21). 
 
190 Donald N Dewees, J. Robert S. Prichard and Michael J. Trebilcock, An Economic Analysis of Cost and Fee 
Rules for Class Action, J. Legal Stud. 155, 166 (1981). The commentators propose nine different rules for 
attorney’s fees with varieties between American rule (no shifting of litigation costs) and English rule (litigation 
The contingent fees compensates the lawyers’ legal services and the loan of such 
services, with a higher risk of default than ordinary market loan, remaining in cases for many 
years outstanding without any interest and to be repaid only and if the lawsuit is successful. 
Of course, these facts make the lawyers very careful in analyzing the expected value of the 
judgment.191 
Even if it is true the contention that contingent fees produce a differential interest 
among class and class attorney (we do not consider a ‘conflict of interest’, because both are 
seeking to maximize the expected utility from the claims or defenses, according to respective 
position in litigation), the attorney stake in a class action is many times superior than in an 
individual lawsuit, what makes him invest optimally, approximating or equalizing the 
investment parties would do, if they were to finance their own litigation.192 
The individuals’ welfare are duly protected by aggregation of claims and defenses 
regardless of a personal day in court. This assertion is based in the rational choice theory. 
Assuming that individuals are rational, seeking their optimal well-being, this is achieved by 
an ideal legal system through optimal precautionary measures, insurance protection, and 
progressive funding thereto. In addition, the model prohibits individual’s self exclusion of the 
system, or, conducts in conflict with the system.193 
Positing aggregation of claims and defenses and the right of “a day in the court” as 
mutually exclusive, the assertion resembles a narrow view of the law enforcement device 
provided by class actions. 
 
D. Appropriate Incentives for Class Counsel 
 
1. The 2003 Amendment to the Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
costs shifting), and, in five of them where there is a contingent fees, the lawyers take the risks of litigation and 
make the decision of filing the lawsuit (Id., 163-6). 
 
191 See, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 584 (cited in note 24). 
 
192 Rosenberg, 62 Ind. L. Rev. 561, 583 (cited in note 21). 
 
193 Only free-riders would prefer to litigate alone because their appropriation and capitalization over the works 
developed by the others. 
In 2002, the United States Judicial Conference adopted the proposed amendments to 
Rule 23, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made by the Advisory Committee of the 
Civil Rules, after more than one decade of studies.194 
It is the most comprehensive modification of the discipline of the class actions, since 
the 1966 Amendments.195 
The modifications are concentrated in four major areas.196 Before analyzing the new 
subdivisions 23(g) and (h), which concerns the appointment of the class counsel and the 
attorney fees award, that are the object of our proposal, it seems appropriate to make a brief 
comment of the previous three. 
 The first one considers the timing of the class certification decision under subdivision 
23(c)(1), establishing that the court’s decision whether to certify a class has to be “at an early 
practicable time”, instead of the previous expression “as soon as practicable after 
commencement of an action”.197 Also, the certification decision is not anymore “conditional”, 
and it may be altered or amended before “final judgment”, instead of the “decision on the 
merits”.198 
194 See, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, Judicial Conference Judgeship 
Recommendations endorsed by Administration 2 (Sept 24, 2002) available online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judconf902.pdf (last visited on April 27, 2006). 
 
195 See, Mullenix, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 177, 177-8 (cited in note 128). 
 
196 Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1753.1, 53-4, (cited in note 79). 
 
197 According to the Manual of Complex Litigation, the ‘early practical time’ is considered the moment when the 
court has sufficient information to decide whether the action meets the certification criteria of Rules 23(a) and 
(b),MCL 4th, §21.133, 252-3. In addition, is important to observe the Notes of the Advisory Committee to the 
2003 Amendments stating that: “Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly 
part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information required 
to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct 
controlled discovery into the ‘merits’, limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an 
informed basis”. 
 
198 The 2003 Amendment Notes of the Advisory Committee explained the modification, as follows: “This 
change avoids the possible ambiguity in referring to ‘the decision on the merits’. Following a determination of 
liability, for example, proceedings to define the remedy may demonstrate the need to amend the class definition 
or subdivide the class. In this setting the final judgment concept is pragmatic. It is not the same as the concept 
used for appeal purposes, but it should be flexible, particularly in protracted litigation”. 
 
The second modification involves the notice provisions in subdivision 23(c)(2), 
authorizing the court to direct appropriate notice to the class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or 
(2)199, and prescribing the mandatory notice requirements under a Rule 23(b)(3) class. 
 The third alteration is related to the process of settlement, voluntary dismissal and 
compromise. Subdivision 23(e)(1)(A) clarifies that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise is concerning claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.200 According to 
subdivision 23(e)(1)(B), in any of the mentioned situation the court must direct notice “in a 
reasonable manner” to all binding class members in any class certified under subdivisions 
23(b)(1) or (2) or (3).201 Also, in order to approve the settlement, voluntary dismissal or 
compromise, the court must find through a mandatory hearing that it is fair, reasonable and 
adequate (23(e)(1)(B). Subdivision 23(e) also establishes the requirements and process for 
filling or objecting a settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise. 
 
2. The Appointment of the Class Counsel and the Attorney Fees 
 
The fourth group of alterations made by the 2003 Amendments to the Rule 23, of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, deals with the appointment of class counsel and the attorney 
fees award. 
 
a) Subdivision 23(g) 
 
199 Nevertheless the 2003 Amendment Notes of the Advisory Committee made it clear that: “The authority to 
direct notice to class members in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action should be exercised with care. For several 
reasons, there may be less need for notice than in a (b)(3) class action. There is no right to request exclusion 
from a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class. The characteristics of the class may reduce the need for formal notice. The cost of 
providing notice, moreover, could easily cripple actions that do not seek damages. The court may decide not to 
direct notice after balancing the risk that notice costs may deter the pursuit of class relief against the benefits of 
notice”. However, if a Rule 23(b)(3) class is certified in conjunction with a (b)(2) class, the (c)(2)(B) notice 
requirements must be satisfied as to the (b)(3) class. 
 
200 Cf. Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1753.1, 53 (cited in note 79); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice,
§23.160 (cited in note 74). 
 
201 Cf. MCL 4th, §21.31, 285; §21.312, 293; Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice, §1797.6, 196 (cited in note 
79). Nonetheless, while Wright-Miller-Kane affirm that the 23(e)(1)(B) notice is not to be sent to those that have 
already opt-out in a 23(b)(3) (Id., §1797.6, 196), in MCL 4th is asserted that even those persons should once 
again be notified to check their interests “to opt back into the class and participate in the proposed settlement” 
(Id., §21.312, 294). For a broad and deep critique to this second opt-out notice in Rule 23(b)(3) classes, see,
Rosenberg, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, passim (cited in note 21). 
The subdivision 23(g) improved the guidelines, requisites and procedure for the 
appointment of the class counsel. As set by the Advisory Committee Notes, the new provision 
is not creating an “entirely new element”, but it is built upon the judicial experience 
recognizing the importance of the court’s evaluation of proposed class counsel. Before the 
amendment, the sole provision that north courts in selecting the class representative and 
counsel was that they must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”, stated in 
Rule 23(a)(4). 
 To the contrary of what happens in an individual litigation, where “a client chooses a 
lawyer, negotiates the terms of the engagement, and monitors the lawyer’s performance”, in 
class actions, this task is performed by the judge “who creates the class by certifying it and 
must supervise those who conduct the litigation on behalf of the class. The judge must ensure 
that the lawyer seeking appointment, as class counsel, will fairly and adequately represent the 
interest of the class”.202 
Hence, with almost the same contents of the subdivision 23(a)(4), concerning the class 
representative, the subdivision 23(g)(1)(B) establishes that “an attorney appointed to serve as 
class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interest of the class”. However, this 
mandatory rule does not purport to supersede or to affect the interpretation of other legislation 
that provides otherwise. For instance, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in various sections of §15 U.S.C.), that 
contains provisions that bear on selection of a lead plaintiff and the retention of counsel.  
 In this sense, it is valid to affirm that the class counsel, conducting the class action, has 
a much higher responsibility to the members of the class than a lawyer in an individual 
lawsuit. 
 
202 Cf. MCL 4th, §21.27, 278. The 2003 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes the same way states: “Paragraph 
1(B) [of subdivision 23(g)] recognizes that the primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from 
appointment as class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the class. The rule thus establishes the 
obligation of class counsel, an obligation that may be different from the customary obligations of counsel to 
individual clients. Appointment as class counsel means that the primary obligation of counsel is to the class 
rather than to any individual members of it. The class representatives do not have an unfettered right to “fire” 
class counsel. In the same vein, the class representatives cannot command class counsel to accept or reject a 
settlement proposal. To the contrary, class counsel must determine whether seeking the court’s approval of a 
settlement would be in the best interests of the class as a whole”.  
 
The new subdivision also provides a method by which the court may make directions, 
from the outset, about the potential fee award to class counsel in the event the action is 
successful (Rule 23(g)(2)(C)). 
 The Advisory Committee Notes asserts that “class counsel must be appointed for all 
classes, including each subclass that the court certifies to represent divergent interests”. In 
such a case, the logical appropriate conduct is to appoint a counsel for each different class, 
exactly because there are divergent interests within them, and a single lawyer would not be 
able to perform his duties because this conflictual circumstance.203 
Moreover, the new subdivision (g)(1)(C) stipulates the issues that the court must and 
may consider in appointing the class counsel, serving also to inform class counsel seeking 
appointment, as explained by the notes of the Advisory Committee.  
 The court must consider: a) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating 
potential claims in the action; b) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other 
complex litigation, and claims in type asserted in the action; d) counsel’s knowledge of the 
applicable law; and, e) the resources counsel will commit to representing the class. And the 
court may: “consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability of to fairly and adequately 
represent the interest of the class”, and “direct potential class counsel to provide information 
on any subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and 
nontaxable costs”, and “make further orders in connection with the appointment”. 
 
b) Subdivision 23(h) 
 
Even tough the Advisory Committee Notes affirmed that: “Fee awards are a powerful 
influence on the way attorneys initiate, develop, and conclude class actions”, the new 
subdivision 23(h) made no substantial modification, whatsoever, to the traditional system of 
awarding attorney fees in class actions. 
 In summary, the rule stipulates the need of a motion for award of attorney fees to be 
made according to Rule 54(d)(2); authorizes any class member or the party whom the 
payment is sought to object the motion; prescribes the possibility of a court’s hearing and 
 
203 See, MCL 4th, §21.27, 278. 
 
findings for its conclusion and refer to a special master or magistrate judge the issues related 
to the amount of the award. 
 
3. Attorney Fees Award 
 
Although the work of the lawyer, as a class counsel in a collective litigation, has a 
very peculiar position differently from the position he holds in ordinary, separate litigation, 
the main incentive is the same in both situation: the compensation for a professional 
exercising his job is his fees.204 
Putting aside other factors that may stimulate the lawyer, as personal satisfaction, 
social recognition, ideological, religious, or political motivations, the enticement for the work 
done is the fees that compensates the investment (of time, resources, expertise etc.) spent in 
the litigation.205 
The plaintiff’s counsel, in class actions, is usually identified as a “private attorney 
general”, the lawyer that prosecutes actions on behalf of numerous individuals similarly 
situated, that they would not do it individually. It is said that the expression “private attorney 
general” was created by Judge Frank delivering the opinion of the Second Circuit in the case 
Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes.206 
Consequently, there is often a great inducement for the attorney to prosecute the action 
because the large expected reward. 
 
204 See, Part IV, D.2.(a), supra.
205 Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 941, 952 (1994-
1995); Developments – The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1827, 1829 (1999-2000). 
 
206 “Instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, to bring such proceedings [to 
vindicate of the public or the government], Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-
official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an 
officer in violation of his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual controversy, and there is 
nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a 
proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such 
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals” (emphasis added), Associated Industries of 
New York State v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d. 694, 704 (2nd Cir. – 1943). See, John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the 
Plaintiff Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing 
Public Goals for Private Gain, 71-3 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice – 2000) (cited hereafter as Hensler, Class 
Actions Dilemmas). 
 
On the other hand, the attorney for a defendant class does not have much of incentive 
to litigate the defense for the class. This is a consequence of the absence of a system that 
optimizes the scale economy of aggregating the defendants to distribute the costs of the 
litigation among all the class members.207 
The most conventional method of compensating the plaintiff’s class counsel is the 
“common fund”, where he creates or preserves a fund for the benefit of the whole class and is 
paid with money from this fund.208 
The court award of attorney fees is justified under the doctrine that members of the 
class, in the collective suit, who obtained a benefit from the lawsuit without compensating for 
its costs, are unjustly enriched. 
 There are two major methods, with some variations and combinations within them, to 
calculate the attorney fees in “common fund” cases: (i) the “percentage method”, a percentage 
of the fund generated by the lawyer activity; or; (ii) the “lodestar method”, based on the 
number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the market rate of lawyers services.209 
Hence, in defendant class actions, where there is a preexisting common fund or an 
escrow account, the legal expenses that the representative party has incurred, especially the 
attorney fees, are to be paid from those sources.210 
Nevertheless, this is a very unlikely situation. In any lawsuit, a favorable adjudication 
to the plaintiff will confer him either monetary award, or, an injunctive or declaratory relief.  
 On the contrary, to the defendant a victory is always a declaratory judgment. The 
advantage that the lawyer confers upon the defendant class is to impede any money 
disbursement, or, to establish by the court’s decision that the plaintiff has no dully rights or 
claims enforceable against them. There is not any money to be collected which could be 
partially used to compensate the lawyer’s work. 
 
207 See, Part IV, A, supra.
208 See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); 
Central R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). 
 
209 For commentaries and critique of both methods of calculating the attorney fees, see, MCL, 4th, §14.12, 186-
96. 
 
210 See, Cranston v. Hardin, 504 F 2d 566 (2nd Cir. - 1974); German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. 
Archambault, 404 S.W. 2d 705 (Mo. - 1966). 
 
Alternatives to compensate the class counsel, based on the appointment of a wealthy 
class representative, or, one that has a high stake in dispute, results invariably in fractional 
aggregation of defendants.211 
This rationale lacks consideration of the primordial scope of the collectivized 
procedures that is to aggregate the defendants in order to attain economy and investment 
scales in the litigation. 
 Other solution to create special interest organizations212 also does not suffice, 
especially in cases where the defendants’ stakes are low, as it happens in television signal 
piracy (DirecTV case) or copyrighted works violated through the Internet (Grokster case).213 
Firstly, because there is not incentive for the aggregation of the defendants in such 
organizations; secondly, these sorts of associations frequently have deficient resources to 
engage in class action litigation.214 
The optimal law enforcement system requires mandatory aggregation of plaintiffs and 
defendants, and for its turn, the optimal incentive to the defendant class counsel is achieved 
by awarding attorney fees by means of a fee-shifting system. 
 The method of awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the litigation, by 
taxing the defeated party, is a rule in England and in most of civil law countries. It is often 
referred to as “English rule” or “indemnity rule”. 
 
211 See, e.g., Wolfson, 38 Ohio St. L. J. 459, 485-8 (cited in note 98). 
 
212 We use the expression “special interest organization” because these organizations are concerned to the 
interest of special sector of the society. Therefore, they do not, at least all of them, seek public goals, in order to 
be called “public interest organizations”. 
 
213 In the Internet music downloading case, a special interest organization has been created: “Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF)”. In spite of the fact that it has helped individuals in separate lawsuits brought by the 
copyright holders, it has not stepped up and required the certification of a defendant class. However, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a class-action lawsuit against AT&T on January 31, 2006, “accusing 
the telecom giant of violating the law and the privacy of its customers by collaborating with the National 
Security Agency in its massive and illegal program to wiretap and data-mine Americans’ communications” (see,
its site www.eff.org , last visited on May 30th, 2006). 
 
214 See, Hensler, Class Actions Dilemmas, 71 (cited in note 206), arguing that: “(…) organizations such as the 
American Liberties Union (ACLU), NAACP, and the National Organization for Women (NOW) do bring class 
actions. But, in practice, most public interest organizations also have insufficient resources to engage in 
systematic monitoring of corporate behavior and extensive class action litigation”. 
In the United States, the so-called “American rule” or “statutory rule” stipulates that 
each party bears his own litigation expenses, including the compensation for his lawyer.215 
Nevertheless, fee-shifting rules are provided in several statutes and mostly “serve the 
public policy of encouraging private enforcement of statutory or constitutional rights”.216 
In addition, the Rule 11, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for legal 
ethics and good faith in litigation, establishing sanctions for frivolous representations to the 
court, which includes the payment of “some or all the reasonable attorneys’ fees” in favor of 
the movant party. 
 The test for the “prevailing party” in fee-shifting case was created by Supreme Court 
in Buckhannon Bd. &. Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., as the one 
that has altered its legal relationship with its adversary through a judgment or consent decree 
entered by the court.217 
Although there is a vast literature on the economic analysis of fee-shifting, our 
assumption advances the subject of the attorney fees for the defendant class lawyer.218 
Even though it our understanding that defendant-favoring fee-shifting is the optimal 
mechanism for every defendant class action, our focus is on the analysis of suits where the 
defendants’ stakes are low, stimulating nuisance value suits brought by plaintiffs. 
 
215 See, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 249, 250 (1975) (“In the United 
States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser”. 
“[t]he general practice of the United States is in opposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice were not strictly 
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute”.  
 
216 Cf. MCL, 4th, §14.13, 196. Also: “Although, as will be seen, Congress has made specific provision for 
attorneys’ fees under certain federal statutes, it has not changed the general statutory rule that allowances for 
counsel fees are limited to the sums specified by the costs statute”. “[a]bsent statute or enforceable contract, 
litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees”(Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 255, 256, 
257 (1975). 
 
217 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001). 
 
218 For a survey of literature on fee-shifting, see, Kathryn M. Christie, Attorney Fee-Shifting: A Bibliography, 47 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 347 (1984). For empirical studies of fee-shifting, see, Edward A. Snyder and James W. 
Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 345, 
377 (1990) (arguing that fee shifting encourages parties to litigate); Edward A. Snyder and James W. Hughes, 
Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. Law & Econ. 225, 
249 (1995) (concluding that the English rule likely reduces the frequency of low-merit claims and lessens the 
overall probability of litigation). For the effect of the different methods of allocation of legal costs on the level of 
litigation, see, Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for 
the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982); Dewees et al., 10 J. Legal Stud. 155 (cited in note 
190). 
 
It is considered defendant-favoring fee-shifting, the fee-shifting on a one-way (or one-
side) basis, granting fees only to the defendant attorney, when the defendants prevail in the 
lawsuit, but not awarding fees to the plaintiff’s lawyer, even if he wins the case. 
 The proposed model addresses the problem of motivating the attorney, hence the class 
representative, to present a defense, instead of just settling with the plaintiff in nuisance value 
suit. The settlement is the likely solution in this kind of suit, because of the asymmetry 
between the costs of separate litigation and the settlement offered by the plaintiff due to the 
absence of the defendant class action. The settlement makes the defendant better off, in 
separate litigation, but it does not in a collective procedure because the cost of litigation is 
shared with the members of the class. The aggregation of defendants and the optimal attorney 
fees award lead to the optimal law enforcement system.219 
Similarly to contingent fees arrangements on the plaintiff’s side, the class counsel in a 
defendant class action assumes the risk of the litigation. 
 Consequently, the strategies for the lawsuit are made on the lawyer’s assessment of 
expected gains and losses, so he will only represent the defendants if the expected value of the 
litigation is positive to him. The investment made by the lawyer equals the compensation he is 
expecting to obtain with the fees. 
 The one-side fee-shifting compensates the lawyers’ legal services and the loan of such 
services, with a higher risk of default than ordinary market loan, remaining in cases for many 
years outstanding without any interest and to be repaid only and if the lawsuit is successful.220 
Although there is not a conclusive analysis, based on empirical studies, about fee-
shifting effects on the level of litigation, or, the tendency of going to trial instead of settling 
the case, or even, the increment of legal expenditures in trial; the use of defendant favoring 
fee-shifting achieves the collective procedure goals of access to justice and equilibrating the 
parties to the suit.221 
219 See the numerical examples in Part IV, B, supra.
220 See, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 584 (cited in note 24). 
 
221 See, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 590 (cited in note 24); Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of 
Law, 429-32 (cited in note 25). 
 
In addition, the one-way use of indemnification is socially desirable in order to prevent 
nuisance value suits. A plaintiff unwilling to go to trial because it would be cost ineffective 
would refrain from filling a nuisance suit, as stated by Professors Rosenberg and Shavell: 
 
“Under the British system, a plaintiff who would be unwilling to litigate would never 
file a claim; in particular, nuisance suits would never occur” (emphasis added).222 
The fee shifting system impedes nuisance value suit, since there are no actual 
economic threats against the defendant, because the judgment in his favor would shift to the 
plaintiff the costs that the former has incurred retaining a lawyer and other taxable litigation 
costs. 
 Of course in circumstances where the plaintiff shows to be judgment-proof, the fee-
shifting rule would be inefficient. But this is not a peculiar situation for defendants’ attorneys, 
as it can happen as well to the plaintiff’s lawyer. The solution would require a security for 
costs posted in the outset of the lawsuit.223 
Considering that there is no money changing hands when the defendant prevails, the 
appropriate scheme to award the class counselor fees is the loadstar method.224 
The court order certifying a defendant class action should appoint the class counsel 
(Rule 23(c)(1)(B) combined with Rule 23(g)(1)(A)), requiring him to formulate a proposal of 
fees. The proposal should present an estimate of the number of hours that reasonably should 
be spent in the lawsuit, and the market value of the hourly charges for lawyers services (Rule 
23(g)(1)(C)(iii)). 
 The advantages of the defendant-favoring fee-shifting system are: (i) overcome the 
asymmetric costs between separate litigation and collective suit, aggregating the multitude of 
 
222 Rosenberg and Shavell, 5 Internat. Rev. Law and Econ. 3, 5 (cited in note 169). See, also. Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 399 (cited in note 25); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang, 
An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and The Role 
of Rule 11, 25 J. Legal Stud. 371 (1996). 
 
223 See, Phillip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 26, 52-3 
(1969-1970). 
 
224 See, MCL, 4th, §14.13, 197. 
defendants, (ii) compensate the class counsel by equalizing his investment in the litigation 
with the amount of the fees award; and, (iii) preclude nuisance value suits. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In the 21st Century, the idea of “mass society” has deeply evolved. People are living in 
an information society, where the furnishment of services and goods are made by 
sophisticated communications links, especially by Internet. These massive and expeditious 
relationships induce lawful and unlawful behaviors. Therefore, a substantial modification on 
the law enforcement has to be realized by the law operators and a choice of solutions to be 
made in order to achieve the optimal enforcement level. 
 In order to achieve this goal, the ideal model of law enforcement system grants 
everyone the best well-being, before and after the fact of a given situation, due to optimal 
deterrence of unreasonable risks, optimal insurance of reasonable risks, and optimal 
redistribution of wealth by progressively funding the preceding two elements. This theory is 
based on the individuals’ rational choice of their maximum well-being. 
 The option is to use mandatory defendant class action because it confers individuals’ 
maximum well-being, as it takes into consideration the deterrence function of the law as well 
as its insurance objective. The result is that the ideal of distributive justice is better served, 
with the procedural law being considered as a tool to achieve the principles enacted in the 
substantive law. 
 The mandatory defendant class action permits dispersed individuals to exploit scale of 
economy and investment in the common defenses in the litigation. Furthermore, the 
compulsory aggregation of defendants and defenses avoids the threat of nuisance value suits 
to be brought by a single plaintiff, or even a plaintiffs’ class. 
 Besides mandatory aggregation of the defendants, the optimal law enforcement system 
requires optimal incentive to the defendant class counsel. 
 Differently from the plaintiff’s perspective, a victory in the litigation to the defendant 
is always a declaratory judgment. The advantage that the lawyer confers upon the defendant 
class is to impede any money disbursement, or, to establish by the court’s decision that the 
plaintiff has no dully rights or claims enforceable against them. Usually, there is not any 
money to be collected which could be partially used to compensate the lawyer’s work. 
 Consequently, the optimal incentives to the defendant lawyer might be obtained by 
awarding attorney fees by means of a fee-shifting method. 
 The specific model proposed is of a defendant-favoring fee-shifting, where the fees are 
granted only to the defendant attorney, when the defendant prevails in the lawsuit, but no fee 
is award to the to the plaintiff’s lawyer, even if he wins the case. 
 This method of awarding attorney fees considers the fact that the lawyer is assuming 
the risk of the litigation. All strategies for the lawsuit are made on the lawyer’s assessment of 
expected gains and losses, so he will only represent the defendants, if the expected value of 
the litigation is positive to him. 
 Considering that there is no money changing hands when the defendant prevails, the 
appropriate scheme to award the class counselor fees is the loadstar method, when the court 
should require, at the moment of certification of the defendant class and appointment of the 
counselor, an estimate of reasonable number of hours to be spent in the lawsuit, and the 
respectively market rate for the legal fees. 
 The investment made by the lawyer equals the compensation he is expecting to obtain 
with the fees. The one-side fee-shifting compensates the lawyers’ legal services and the loan 
of such services, with a higher risk of default than ordinary market loan, remaining in cases 
for many years outstanding without any interest and to be repaid, only and if, the lawsuit is 
successful. 
 
